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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
After three weeks of trial and careful deliberation, the 
jury in this case found that Anthony W. Middleton, Jr. ("Anthony 
Middleton") and his wife, Carol S. Middleton ("Carol Middleton") 
intentionally, wrongfully and maliciously interfered with Medical 
Leasing1s prospective economic relationship with The Boyer Company 
with the dominant purpose to harm Medical Leasing and thereby also 
breached paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease between the 
parties and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing implied 
therein by sabotaging a proposed sublease between Medical Leasing 
and The Boyer Company with threats of groundless litigation unless 
Medical Leasing surrendered to Anthony Middletonfs demands for 
additional compensation. The court then properly ruled that all 
of the Middletons were jointly liable for Anthony Middleton1s 
breach of contract because they were all the "Landlord" under the 
Amended Ground Lease. 
The Middletons now ask this court to cast aside the jury's 
verdict. The Middletons1 protest — but abjectly fail to 
demonstrate — that the evidence as a matter of law was not 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the court 
committed errors of law during the trial. In that regard, the 
Middletons have an absolute obligation to marshal all of the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which 
support the verdict. Only then can they attempt to demonstrate 
there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. They do 
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not even attempt to marshal the evidence. Instead, they select 
small pieces of the record, typically out of context, cast those 
small bits in a light favorable to the Middletons and thereby 
ignore most of the evidence upon which the jury based its verdict. 
The jury heard and conscientiously decided this case. The 
evidence was more than sufficient to support its verdict. The jury 
was properly instructed concerning the law and no legal errors were 
committed which would remotely justify the repudiation of the 
jury's verdict. As will now be demonstrated, the jury's verdict 
and the judgment rendered thereon should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989). 
III. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly admit Medical Leasing's 
and the Middletons1 evidence regarding the Zions Litigation? The 
standard of review on this issue is whether the trial court's 
ruling was clearly erroneous. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales 
Corp.. 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). 
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2. Did the trial court correctly rule that the Amended 
Ground Lease between the parties did not require written notice of 
default as a condition precedent to bringing suit for breach of the 
express terms of the lease and/or the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing? The standard of review of this is de novo 
review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 
1985) . 
3. Even if written notice of default had been required by 
the Amended Ground Lease, did Medical Leasing give the required 
written notice of default before commencing suit? The standard of 
review on this issue is whether taking all the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, the jury's determination is clearly erroneous. Car 
Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 83 (Utah 1981). 
4. Did Anthony Middleton's intentional and malicious 
threats of groundless litigation, made with the dominant purpose 
and/or intended immediate effect to injure Medical Leasing by 
derailing its sublease with The Boyer Company, constitute a breach 
of the express provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground 
Lease under which the Middletons agreed that Medical Leasing could 
lease the Property to an unrelated third party for development 
without the Middletons' consent unless subordination was sought? 
The standard of review with respect to Anthony Middleton's conduct 
is whether taking all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict 
and all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom and viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury's 
4 
determination is clearly erroneous. Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 
supra. The standard of review with respect to the interpretation 
of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease is de 
novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell, supra. 
5. Did the trial court properly award Medical Leasing 
attorney's fees in view of the jury's verdict that the Middletons 
breached the lease and that Anthony Middleton and Carol Middleton 
interfered with Medical Leasing fs prospective business relationship 
with The Boyer Company? The standard of review on this issue is 
de novo review for correctness. Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1992). 
6. Did the trial court properly rule that as a matter of 
law all of the Middletons were liable on the breach of contract 
claims because they were the "Landlord" under the Amended Ground 
Lease between the parties and undertook the same obligations and 
duties and promised the same performance thereunder? The standard 
of review on this issue is de novo review for correctness. Kimball 
v. Campbell, supra. 
7. Did the trial court properly rule that Medical Leasing 
had pled sufficient facts in its Amended Complaint to raise the 
issue of whether the Middletons were jointly liable for breach of 
contract as "Landlord" under the Amended Ground Lease? The 
standard of review on this issue is whether the trial court's 
decision was clearly erroneous. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales 
Corp.f supra. 
8. Was there any substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict that Anthony Middleton's threats of groundless 
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litigation caused damage to Medical Leasing? The standard of 
review on this issue is whether taking all the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, the jury's determination is clearly erroneous. Car 
Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, supra. 
9. Was the jury's verdict that Anthony Middleton 
intentionally and maliciously made threats of groundless litigation 
with the dominant purpose and/or the intended immediate effect to 
harm Medical Leasing supported by any substantial evidence and, if 
so, was that sufficient to satisfy the improper purpose or improper 
means element of Medical Leasing's interference with prospective 
business relationship claims? The standard of review with respect 
to the jury's findings is whether taking all the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and all reasonable inferences to be 
derived therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict, the jury's determination is clearly 
erroneous. Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, supra. The standard of 
review on the issue of the legal requirements of the improper 
purpose and improper means elements is de novo review for 
correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
10. Did the trial court correctly reject the Middletons1 
contention that they were privileged, as a matter of law, to 
intentionally and maliciously make threats of groundless litigation 
with the dominant purpose, or intended immediate effect, to harm 
Medical Leasing? The standard of review on this issue is de novo 
review for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra. 
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11. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury on 
recovery of future lost profits and damages? The standard of 
review on this issue is de novo review for correctness. Ramon v. 
Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
12. Was the trial court's decision on the amount of 
attorney's fees Medical Leasing was entitled to recover supported 
by the evidence? The standard of review on this issue is whether 
there was any substantial evidence to support the court's exercise 
of its discretion. Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, supra. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises out of an Amended Ground Lease entered 
into between Medical Leasing and the Middletons in 1980 with 
respect to an approximately nine (9) acre parcel of land on the 
northwest corner of 3900 South and 700 East in Salt Lake County 
(the "Property"). The Amended Ground Lease, before and after it 
was modified by a settlement stipulation entered into in the 
previous Zions Litigation (discussed below), gave Medical Leasing 
the right to sublease the undeveloped portion of the Property for 
development by an independent third party without the Middletons' 
consent unless subordination was sought. 
When Medical Leasing attempted to sublease a portion of 
the Property to The Boyer Company for a large commercial 
7 
development on a long-term sublease which would have netted Medical 
Leasing millions of dollars over the life of the sublease, Anthony 
Middleton intentionally and maliciously interfered and eventually 
sabotaged the transaction by making threats of groundless 
litigation unless his demands that the Middletons share in the 
revenues were met. After The Boyer Company withdrew from the 
transaction, Medical Leasing commenced this action seeking recovery 
for breach of the express provisions of paragraph 8 of the Amended 
Ground Lease and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and for interference with prospective economic relations 
and other relief. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Medical Leasing commenced this lawsuit on February 16, 
1990. [R. 2]. In addition to claims for the breach of express and 
implied contract and interference with prospective economic 
relations, the original Complaint also contained a claim for 
interference with contract and for a declaratory judgment and 
injunction. The Complaint alleged that all of the Middletons were 
the Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease, that Anthony Middleton 
acted as their agent and that all the Middletons were liable for 
the damages alleged in the Complaint. 
The Middletons filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. 
The trial court dismissed Count I for declaratory judgment and 
injunction. Medical Leasing then filed an Amended Complaint 
containing the same claims for relief, except for the declaratory 
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relief and injunction claim which had been dismissed. [R. 319]. 
The Middletons moved for summary judgment. The court granted that 
motion with respect to the Second Claim for Relief for interference 
with contract on the basis that the Development Agreement between 
Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company upon which that claim was 
based had expired by its own terms. The remainder of the 
Middletons1 motion was denied. [R. 1078]. 
On February 11, 1992, the case went to jury trial. After 
approximately three weeks of trial, the jury returned its verdict 
determining that Anthony Middleton and his wife, Carol Middleton,1 
were liable for breach of contract and interference with 
prospective business relationship and awarding compensatory damages 
in favor of Medical Leasing in the amount of $2,582,780.00, 
together with interest and punitive damages against Anthony 
Middleton in the sum of $75,000.00. [R. 1569, 1584]. 
Judge Rigtrup had reserved the issue of whether the other 
Middletons were liable for Anthony Middleton's breach of contract 
pending receipt of the jury verdict. After the jury returned its 
verdict, Judge Rigtrup ruled that because the Middletons had all 
executed the Amended Ground Lease with Medical Leasing as the 
"Landlord" and had promised the same performance thereunder that 
the Middletons were all liable for the breach of contract. [R. 
2962]. The Middletons then filed Motions for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial which were denied by 
the trial court. [R. 1903-2248]. 
Carol Middleton's liability was co-extensive with that of Anthony Middleton by her testimony that he 
acted as her agent with respect to the Property and in all respects. [R. 5034]. 
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Pursuant to previous agreement between the parties, the 
issue of attorney's fees was reserved for ruling by the trial court 
upon affidavits. Medical Leasing's Motion for Award of Attorney's 
Fees and Costs was supported by extensive affidavits, including 
copies of all billings substantiating the services performed on 
behalf of Medical Leasing. Medical Leasing sought attorney's fees 
in the amount of $319,502.00 and costs consisting principally of 
expert fees in the amount of $55,536.26. The court determined that 
$275,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee and the Middletons 
stipulated not to contest that amount except they reserved their 
right to contend that Medical Leasing had not properly allocated 
its fees between claims on which attorney's fees could be awarded 
and claims on which attorney's fees could supposedly not be 
awarded. 
Thereafter, the court entered judgment in favor of Medical 
Leasing on August 28, 1992 in the amount of $2,582,780.00 plus 
attorney's fees in the amount of $275,000.00, together with 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum. [R. 2954]. It is from this 
judgment that the Middletons appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The Medical Leasinq-Middleton Ground Leases 
1. The Middletons are owners as tenants in common of the 
real property which is the subject of this action consisting of 
approximately nine (9) acres located at the northwest corner of 700 
East 3900 South in Salt Lake County (the "Property") . The Property 
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was previously owned by Richard P. Middleton, Anthony W. Middleton, 
Sr. and Delores Middleton, who were brothers and sister. [R. 4 317 
and 4972]. Medical Leasing is a partnership comprised of Dr. 
Wallace H. Ring ("Ring"), Dr. John C. Adair ("Adair") and Dr. Harry 
C. Wong ("Wong"). [R. 3988]. 
2. On July 21, 1975, the Middletons leased the Property 
to Medical Leasing's predecessor, Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc., 
for a term of fifty years with an option to renew for an additional 
thirty years. Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc. intended to and did 
construct a surgical center on two acres of the Property. The 
Middletons agreed to subordinate their ownership interest to the 
construction lender's Trust Deed in order to facilitate the 
project. [Plaintiff's Ex. 1]. 
3. In 1980, Medical Leasing proposed to expand the 
surgical center and the parties entered into an Amended Ground 
Lease dated August 1, 1980 pursuant to which the Middletons agreed 
to subordinate an additional .75 acres for the expansion of the 
surgical center in return for lease concessions to the Middletons. 
[Plaintiff's Ex. 3]. 
4. Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease dealt with 
Medical Leasing's right to develop additional portions of the 
Property in the future. Paragraph 8 provided that the Middletons 
were not obligated to subordinate any additional portion of the 
Property and that Medical Leasing could not further develop the 
Property without the Middletons' consent, except that Medical 
Leasing was not precluded "from selling or subleasing its interest 
in the remaining portion of the Leased Premises to an independent 
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third party for development or otherwise, provided Lessee is not 
a joint venturer, partner, stockholder, participant, or otherwise 
involved, directly or indirectly in the development of the Property 
with such third party." [Plaintiff's Ex. 3]. 
The Zions's Litigation 
5. In August, 1980, Medical Leasing entered into a 
sublease with Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for the sublease 
of a portion of the Property for the construction by Zions of a 
branch office. [Plaintiff's Ex. 4]. After Zions obtained the 
proceeds of an industrial revenue bond offering for the 
construction of a permanent facility, it became concerned as to 
whether paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease required that the 
Middletons' consent be obtained for the proposed development and 
requested that the Middletons simply confirm that their consent was 
not necessary or, in the alternative, give their consent. The 
Middletons refused to do either and, through their attorney, simply 
told Zions it would have to proceed at its peril. [R. 4010-4016, 
4026-4050; Plaintiff's Exs. 7, 8 and 9]. Accordingly, in January, 
1983, Zions commenced litigation (the "Zions Litigation") against 
the Middletons and Medical Leasing seeking a declaration that no 
consent of the Middletons was necessary for Zions1 proposed 
development or, if it were necessary, that Medical Leasing was 
obligated to obtain such consent. [R. 4037; Plaintiff's Ex. 10]. 
6. The Middletons filed a Third Party Complaint and 
Counterclaim in the Zions Litigation in which, among other things, 
they asked for a declaration as to whether their consent was 
necessary for the Zions development, and alleged that at the time 
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the Amended Ground Lease had been negotiated and executed they had 
understood that their consent would be necessary before any 
significant future development of the Property was undertaken, that 
by mistake the Amended Ground Lease did not accurately reflect that 
supposed right, and therefore they were entitled to reformation of 
the Amended Ground Lease. [R. 4113-4115; Plaintiff's Exs. 11 and 
15]. At the trial subject of this appeal, it was admitted that 
such allegations were not true. [R. 5031-5032, 5693-5700, 4013-
4020, 4324-4338, 5578-5584]. 
7. In July, 1983, the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings, Judge, entered partial summary judgment in 
favor of Zions determining as a matter of law that the consent of 
the Middletons was not required for Zions1 development of the 
Property. [Plaintiff's Ex. 12]. 
8. Thereafter, in 1985, the Zions Litigation was fully 
settled pursuant to a Stipulation and Mutual Release of All Claims. 
As part of the settlement, Medical Leasing paid the Middletons 
$21,000 and paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease was restated 
as follows: 
[C]onsent of the Middletons to the future development 
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the 
Lessee shall seek to develop the Property or an 
independent third party sublessee or assignee requires 
that the interest of the Middletons be subordinated 
to the interest of a development lender. In other 
words, the lessee may not develop the property without 
the consent of the Middletons, but a third party 
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the 
lessee may further develop the Property without the 
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed 
capital provided subordination of the interest of the 
Middletons is not required for said development. 
[R. 4042-4044 and Plaintiff's Ex. 16]. 
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The Boyer Company Negotiations 
9. After soliciting Medical Leasing's interest, on or 
about March 8, 1988, The Boyer Company made a written proposal to 
lease 5.135 acres of the Property for an annual ground lease 
payment of $111,840.00 with escalations. [R. 4059 and Plaintiff's 
Ex. 20]. In the initial discussions, Medical Leasing made it clear 
that Boyer would have to live with the terms of the Amended Ground 
Lease and that no subordination or amendments could be requested 
of the Middletons. Boyer responded to the effect that if Zions 
could develop the Property on that basis, so could he. [R. 4052-
4053]. 
10. Thereafter, Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company 
engaged in negotiations which culminated in the execution of a 
Development Agreement dated June 14, 1988. The Development 
Agreement provided for rental at the rate of $111,84 0.00 per year 
with escalations. Boyer1s obligation to lease the Property was 
subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions precedent such as 
rezoning of the Property and other matters. The agreement provided 
that the lease would be executed no later than December 31, 1988. 
The Development Agreement did not contain any contingency regarding 
The Boyer Company's ability to obtain financing for the proposed 
commercial business and professional office space development. 
Boyer understood that the Development Agreement would be subject 
to the Amended Ground Lease. [R. 4088, 4840; Plaintiff's Ex. 22]. 
11. The Boyer Company prepared drawings, site plans and 
financial proformas. [Plaintiff's Exs. 23 and 50]. The Boyer 
Company undertook to fulfill the conditions precedent contained in 
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the Development Agreement and after what Greg Gardner of The Boyer 
Company described as "a long and arduous process" was successful 
in having the Property rezoned in October, 1988. [Plaintiff's Ex. 
28] . 
12. By letter dated December 22, 1988, H. Roger Boyer 
("Boyer") of The Boyer Company notified Medical Leasing that the 
contingencies set forth in the Development Agreement had been 
fulfilled and requested an extension of the December 31, 1988 
deadline for executing a written lease to January 31, 1989. 
Medical Leasing agreed to this request. [Plaintiff's Ex. 32]. 
13. On February 3, 1989, John Parsons ("Parsons"), the 
attorney for Medical Leasing, transmitted to Greg Gardner at The 
Boyer Company a proposed sublease. Although the January 31, 1989 
deadline had expired, Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company 
continued negotiating the sublease in good faith without any 
mention that the deadline had expired. [R. 4499-4500, 4517, 4521-
4522, 4537; Plaintiff's Ex. 33]. 
14. The Boyer Company sent the proposed sublease to its 
attorney, Victor A. Taylor ("Taylor") at Kimball, Parr, Crockett 
& Waddoups for review. Taylor then delivered a letter dated March 
14, 1989 to Parsons containing his comments on the proposed 
sublease. In that letter, Taylor requested that there be included 
in the sublease a non-disturbance and attornment clause pursuant 
to which the Middletons would consent to and approve of the 
sublease and agree that in the event the Amended Ground Lease with 
Medical Leasing was terminated that The Boyer Company's rights 
would not be adversely affected and the sublease would continue in 
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full force and effect between the Middletons and The Boyer Company. 
Taylor also expressed concern that § 5.3(ii) of the sublease which 
provided for an annual rental escalation based upon increases in 
the rental income received from the premises by The Boyer Company 
constituted a breach of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease 
between the Middletons and Medical Leasing because paragraph 8 of 
the Amended Ground Lease only gave Medical Leasing the right to 
sublease the Property for development by a third party if Medical 
Leasing was not "a joint venturer, partner, stockholder, 
participant, or otherwise involved, directly or indirectly in the 
development of the Property with such third party." In this 
regard, the purported language which gave rise to Taylor's concern 
had been superseded by the settlement stipulation in the Zions 
Litigation which did not contain any such limitation on Medical 
Leasing's right to sublease. Taylor later admitted he was not 
aware of the later agreement. [R. 4499-4501, 4506, 5475; 
Plaintiff's Ex. 16; Defendants1 Ex. 14]. 
15. Two days later, on March 16, 1989, Boyer, Gardner and 
Taylor, representing The Boyer Company, met with Dr. Wong and 
Parsons, representing Medical Leasing, to discuss the concerns 
raised in Taylor's March 14, 1989 letter. During that meeting, 
Parsons explained to Taylor that the language that Taylor relied 
upon from the Amended Ground Lease concerning Medical Leasing's 
participation in the development of the project as a joint 
venturer, partner, etc. had been deleted. Parsons further 
explained to Taylor that in the Zions sublease the parties had 
included a requirement that in the event Medical Leasing received 
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any notice of default from the Middletons that the notice be 
promptly given to Zions and Zions would have a right to cure the 
default. Parsons suggested that provision was a good substitute 
for the requested non-recognition and attornment provisions. 
Parsons agreed to send Taylor a copy of the Zions stipulation and 
the relevant provision of the Zions sublease. Boyer expressed his 
desire to go forward with the project. No one said anything about 
the Development Agreement having expired or the deal being off. 
[R. 4509-4515, 4884-4888]. 
16. On or about April 10, 1989, Parsons sent a letter to 
The Boyer Company enclosing a copy of the relevant portion of the 
Zions sublease. [R. 4517-4518; Defendants1 Ex. 15]. 
17. On July 25, 1989, a meeting was held in the Board room 
of Parsons1 law office. Drs. Adair, Wong and Ring and Parsons 
attended representing Medical Leasing, and Boyer, Gardner and 
Taylor attended representing The Boyer Company. Taylor again 
started expressing his concerns expressed in his March 14, 1989 
letter. Dr. Ring heatedly told Taylor that Medical Leasing had 
made it clear before that it was not going to ask for any 
concessions from the Middletons and that Medical Leasing would not 
deal with those issues. Boyer waived off his attorney, saying: 
"That's not important. We don't need to deal with that. We can 
work around that. Let's get — go ahead and make this deal. I 
came here to make a deal, I didn't come here to break one." Boyer 
then expressed that his major concern was that he did not want to 
get into the litigation box Zions had gotten itself into and that 
he wanted to talk with his good friend, Anthony Middleton, to 
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determine the Middletons1 attitude on development of the Property. 
Medical Leasing finally agreed that Boyer could talk with Anthony 
Middleton provided that he would not ask for anything from the 
Middletons and no money would be offered. Bover stated that the 
only thing that he could see that would stop The Bover Company from 
going forward with the sublease was the threat of litigation from 
the Middletons. [R. 4116-4122, 4281, 4531-4536, 4888-4894]. 
18. Anthony Middleton and Boyer were good friends, having 
attended East High School together. As of 1989-1990 they were 
serving together in their church, Boyer being in the Stake 
Presidency and Anthony Middleton on the Stake High Council, 
overseeing the religious affairs of their Stake. Their 
relationship continued through the time of the trial. [R. 4 341-
4342]. 
The Wrongful Threats of Groundless Litigation 
19. After the July 25, 1989 meeting, Boyer contacted 
Anthony Middleton and explained that The Boyer Company was going 
to develop the Property. Anthony Middleton1s entry in his diary 
on August 6, 1989 demonstrated his knowledge that Medical Leasing 
was entitled to sublease the Property to The Boyer Company without 
the Middletons• consent and his chagrin that the Middletons would 
not be entitled to any share of the profits: 
I just learned two weekends ago from Roger Boyer 
that something was up with the 3 9th South property and 
his comment to me just in passing at church was that 
we needed to talk for a few minutes about what was 
going on there, and he implied that I must already 
know. In fact, I had heard nothing about it and I 
called up Dick Middleton and asked if he had heard 
something and he had not. 
Last night I got ahold of Roger after having 
tried through the week without success to do so and 
it turns out that Dr. Wong, Ring and Adair are trying 
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to get The Boyer Company to develop both retail shops 
as well as business offices on the property. Roger's 
company is so strong that they can do without 
subordination and I suspect we are dead in the water 
the way that stupid contract is put together by Uncle 
Dick and William Morel. I am going to meet with Roger 
this coming Tuesday morning to go over the plans and 
see if there is something that can be done about it, 
but my strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have 
to live with the idea that those birds will derive a 
very handsome income off the development without 
actually including the actual owners of the land at 
all. 
[R. 4345-4347; Plaintiff's Ex. 37]. 
20. On August 7 or 8, 1989, Anthony Middleton met with 
Boyer to review The Boyer Company's plans for the project. Anthony 
Middleton discussed with Boyer whether the consent of the 
Middletons was necessary for development of the Property by The 
Boyer Company. Anthony Middleton told Boyer that it was his 
position and that of the other family members that, "any 
development would require compensation to the owner" and "that they 
had to be part of the eventual development mix." That was the same 
position that the Middletons had taken in the Zions Litigation. 
Anthony Middleton reported this conversation and his statement of 
the position of the Middletons to both George Middleton and Richard 
G. Middleton. Either at this meeting or at subsequent meetings, 
Anthony Middleton told Boyer that if the Middletons were not 
compensated there would be litigation. Boyer told Anthony 
Middleton he was not interested in doing the development if there 
was going to be litigation. [R. 4347-4354]. 
21. On September 26, 1989, a meeting was held at The Boyer 
Company's offices attended by Boyer, Anthony Middleton and Dr. Ring 
to attempt to alleviate Boyer's concerns about the Middletons 
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filing suit. In that meeting, Boyer repeated that The Boyer 
Company wanted to do the development, but that he was not 
interested in going forward if there was going to be litigation. 
Boyer stated that Anthony Middleton seemed to have the idea that 
consent of the Middletons was required before he could build 
anything; but it seemed clear under the lease between the 
Middletons and Medical Leasing that Middletons1 consent to the 
sublease was not required. Anthony Middleton responded that it was 
his position and the position of the Middletons that if there was 
any further development of the Property they had a right to 
participate and that, "If so much as a stake was driven into the 
ground, there would be a lawsuit, unless we participate." Boyer 
asked Anthony Middleton his basis for threatening suit and Dr. 
Middleton responded, "I have a philosophical basis, as the rightful 
landowner, to participate, that's the only basis I need." Dr. 
Middleton did not contend that there was any provision in the 
Amended Ground Lease requiring the Middletons1 consent or entitling 
them to any compensation. The only thing asked of Anthony 
Middleton at that meeting was to withdraw the threats of 
litigation. Anthony Middleton made the following entry in his 
diary concerning that meeting: 
The following night, September 2 6th, I met with 
Roger Boyer concerning the development of the 39th 
South and 7th East property owned by the Middleton 
family. It turns out that Wally Ring and that bunch 
talked Boyer into developing the rest of the property 
with commercial development, putting up an office 
complex as well as a few retail shops. Roger Boyer 
kindly tipped me off to the whole thing, wondering if 
the family was acquiescing to that. On the 2 6th I met 
with Roger, Greg Gardner (Kim's brother) [sic], and 
Wally Ring at Roger's offices. We sat down and went 
through the history of the contract and leases, me 
giving my side of it, and Wally Ring giving his side 
of it, and in a rather amicable session I felt that 
everybody had agreed that there would be some 
compensation paid the Middleton family . . . 
At any rate, we got the point made since then 
that the only thing we are interested in is increasing 
the income realized from the property in return for 
which the Middleton family will agree not to challenge 
the contract in court. 
[R. 4126-4127, 4271-4272, 4282, 4357-4361; Plaintiff's Ex. 37]. 
The Prospective Economic Relationship is Destroyed 
22. Before the meeting of September 26, 1989 broke up, 
Boyer expressed, as he had previously expressed to Anthony 
Middleton, that the threats of litigation would not allow him to 
go forward. [R. 4134-4135]. Clearly, those threats caused The 
Boyer Company to withdraw from the sublease. The litigation 
threats were made notwithstanding the fact that the Middletons had 
not been asked for any concessions and they knew very well that 
their consent to the transaction was not required. After the 
September 26, 1989 meeting, every discussion related to the threats 
of litigation, and Medical Leasing was forced to conduct a salvage 
operation in an attempt to put back together the deal with The 
Boyer Company which the Middletons had subverted. Medical 
Leasingfs efforts were unavailing and after that all the 
discussions, which had previously narrowed to boiler plate clauses 
of a draft sublease, instead centered on the threats of litigation 
and the original deal was never retrieved. [R. 4127-4129; 4132-
4133; 4542; 4656]. 
23. On November 11, 1989, Boyer, Anthony Middleton and 
Drs. Ring and Wong met at Boyer1 s home, in what was a continuing 
effort by Medical Leasing to resolve the Middletons1 threats of 
litigation. However, at the meeting, Anthony Middleton would not 
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relent and in fact repeated his threat of litigation if the 
Middletons were not compensated. Boyer stated that he was in a 
litigation box; if he went forward with the development the 
Middletons would sue and if he refused to go forward Medical 
Leasing would sue. Anthony Middleton would not withdraw the 
threats of litigation. [R. 5622-5627; Defendants1 Ex. 27; 
Plaintiff's Ex. 37]. 
24. On November 17, 1989, in an effort to have the 
Middletons take back their threats of litigation so the sublease 
with The Boyer Company could proceed, Medical Leasing's attorney, 
Parsons, sent a letter to Anthony Middleton demanding that the 
litigation threats be withdrawn and that the Middletons execute a 
Second Amended Ground Lease expressly containing a provision 
calling for attornment and recognition, a right for The Boyer 
Company to cure any default by Medical Leasing and an agreement to 
give The Boyer Company a notice of default by Medical Leasing. 
These concessions, not previously needed, were requested in the 
hope that they would remedy the problems caused The Boyer Company 
by the prior threats and would mitigate Medical Leasing1s damages. 
[R. 4538; Plaintiff's Ex. 39]. Thereafter, on December 8, 1989, 
Parsons sent a copy of the November 17 letter to Richard P. 
Middleton, requesting that he send copies to all of the Middletons. 
The Middletons would not withdraw the threats. [Defendants1 Ex. 
32] . 
25. Parsons, on behalf of Medical Leasing, engaged in 
various communications with George Hunt, attorney for Anthony 
Middleton, during December and January, 1990 in an attempt to 
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persuade the Middletons to withdraw the threats and mitigate the 
damages caused by their wrongful conduct. On January 4, 1990, 
Parsons wrote to Mr. Hunt informing him that unless some 
communication was received from the Middletons by January 15, 1990 
regarding the assurances requested in Parsons1 December 8, 1989 
letter, that Medical Leasing would proceed with litigation. [R. 
4546-4547; Plaintiff's Ex. 44]. 
The Boyer Company's Formal Withdrawal 
26. On February 5, 1990, Taylor wrote a letter on behalf 
of The Boyer Company to Parsons on behalf of Medical Leasing 
informing Medical Leasing that The Boyer Company was not interested 
in pursuing further negotiations with respect to the sublease until 
such time as Medical Leasing was able to obtain the cooperation of 
the Middletons "reasonably necessary to make the Ground Lease 
financiable." [R. 4548-4549; Defendants1 Ex. 39]. 
27. Shortly thereafter, on February 15, 1990, Boyer 
acknowledged, consistent with his prior statements that only 
threats of litigation would kill the deal, that the reason The 
Boyer Company was backing off from the development was because of 
the litigation threats. Boyer stated, in a meeting with Medical 
Leasing: 
Well, we had, you know, Tony, he's called a 
couple of times. In fact, he called me I think it was 
last week and told me, I guess the essence of his 
comment was, I feel more strongly about the strength 
of my position, that almost is a direct quote, than 
I have ever before, after having gotten into this, 
which I honestly don't know how he could arrive at 
that conclusion, but that is his conclusion. 
. . . 
We had a discussion with Vic and he has 
suggested, and I don't know, if they have even been 
sent, but we are sending you a letter saying, look, 
this is a draft of it, saying, look, get your act 
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together, when we can make a deal, let's talk about 
a deal. In the meantime, we're kind of stepping back. 
[Defendants1 Ex. 58 at p. 4]. 
Medical Leasing's Damages 
28. Absent the Middletons1 threats of litigation, The 
Boyer Company could have financed the development of the Property 
without requiring any concessions from the Middletons or any 
changes in the Amended Ground Lease between the Middletons and 
Medical Leasing. The Boyer Company was one of the best developers 
in the business and the Property was one of the best commercial 
locations in the valley. The year 1989 was at the height of a boom 
period in the commercial real estate finance industry. Mr. Henry 
Schwendiman, Medical Leasing's financing expert, concluded, after 
reviewing all of the relevant factors and documents, that it was 
more probable than not — 60/4 0 — that The Boyer Company could 
have financed the project and that if The Boyer Company had 
accomplished a few routine steps such as execution of a sublease 
and pre-leasing 30% of the project that, in his opinion, The Boyer 
Company could certainly have obtained financing. [R. 5094, 5147-
5148, 5080-5081, 5100-5101, 5119, 5107-5108]. Boyer himself 
expressed confidence from the beginning that The Boyer Company 
could finance the project and said if Zions could do it so could 
he [R. 4051-4052]; in fact, Boyer was so confident about financing 
that he never even made financing a condition of signing a sublease 
with Medical Leasing. [Plaintiff's Ex. 22]. 
29. The uncontradicted evidence at trial demonstrated that 
because of the wrongful litigation threats Medical Leasing lost a 
unique opportunity for development of the Property and thereby 
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suffered millions of dollars in damages. The only evidence on 
damages presented at trial was the testimony of Plaintiff's 
experts, Henry Schwendiman and Merrill Norman. In summary, Mr. 
Schwendiman testified that because of the state of commercial 
lending and the economy relating to commercial office space after 
the Middletons torpedoed the deal with The Boyer Company, there 
would only be a remote chance that a developer could obtain 
financing for the development on Medical Leasing's ground lease 
within the ten years following the trial and that because at the 
end of ten years the remaining term of the Amended Ground Lease 
would be insufficient to amortize the developer fs loan so the 
developer could realize an adequate return on his investment, that 
Medical Leasing would not be able to get a developer interested in 
developing the Property in the future. [R. 5100-5101, 5124-5127, 
5136-5145]. Thus, Medical Leasing's transaction with The Boyer 
Company was an opportunity which was lost because of the 
Middletons1 threats of litigation. As a result, Mr. Norman 
prepared a detailed damage study with precise calculations which 
supported his testimony that Medical Leasing was damaged in the 
amount of $2,582,780.00, representing, inter alia, the present 
value of the rent which Medical Leasing would have received from 
The Boyer Company under the proposed sublease. [Plaintiff's Ex. 
47]. 
30. The damage evidence of Medical Leasing was entirely 
unrebutted by the Middletons. [R. 5218-5220; Plaintiff's Ex. 47]. 
In fact, opposing counsel argued that no development could occur 
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under Medical Leasing1s Amended Ground Lease then or at any time. 
[R. 4258]. 
V. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE MIDDLETONS1 STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Medical Leasing specifically objects to the following 
"facts" set forth in the Middletons1 Statements of Facts: 
1. The Middletons state that they signed the Amended 
Ground Lease separately as "Landlord". [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 
10; Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 7]. This is a mischaracterization. 
In fact, the Middletons were referred to in the Amended Ground 
Lease collectively as the "Landlord" and all signed the same 
Amended Ground Lease in that capacity. [Plaintiff's Ex. 3]. 
2. The Middletons claim that they believed they would be 
able to participate in further development of the Property because 
they understood that if Medical Leasing subleased any portion of 
the Property that the developer's lender would very likely insist 
that the Middletons subordinate their fee ownership interest to the 
lender's lien and that if Medical Leasing asked for consent or 
subordination for development, they could rightly ask for more 
income on the lease in return. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 10]. 
The Middletons cite pages 4998-5004 and the unnumbered page 
following 5701 of the record. Aside from the fact that this 
evidence is irrelevant because no one asked them for the 
subordination, the record does not support these claims. In fact, 
the cited portions of the record dealt for the most part with 
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Richard P. Middleton's goals and expectations for the Property in 
years past and not at the time of the transaction with The Boyer 
Company. There is testimony that Anthony and Richard G. Middleton 
thought that if subordination or some other changes were required 
to make the project feasible, then they ought to be able to 
participate, but not that subordination or other changes would be 
required. 
3. The Middletons claim that Zions insisted that they 
expressly consent to the Zions sublease. [Williams & Hunt Brief, 
p. 11; Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 8]. In fact, Zions requested that 
the Middletons either acknowledge that their consent was not 
necessary for the construction of a branch bank on the Property or, 
in the alternative, that the Middletons consent to such 
construction. [R. 4010-4016, 4026-4050; Plaintiffs Exs. 7, 8 and 
9]. 
4. The Middletons state: "The Amended Ground Lease 
specifically states the Middletons are not required to give further 
consent or subordination for development, but that such consent is 
'solely at Landlord's discretion.'" This is a blatant 
misstatement. [Moyle & Draper Brief, pp. 7-8]. The restated 
paragraph 8 doesn't say the Middletons aren't required to give 
consent. What it really says is, "consent of the Middletons to 
future development of the leased premises is not required" unless 
subordination is required. And far from suggesting that their 
consent is "solely at the Landlord's discretion", the revision 
struck that language and, to make sure of its meaning, stated: "In 
other words . . . a third party sublessee . . . may further 
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develop the property without the consent of the Middletons. . . ." 
[Plaintiff's Ex. 16, pp. 4-5]. 
5. Counsel for Anthony Middleton suggests that Boyer 
testified that items requested by Taylor were necessary to obtain 
financing and that such testimony was unimpeached. [Williams & 
Hunt Brief, pp. 36-37].2 Characteristically, the Middletons ignore 
the portions of the record favorable to the position of Medical 
Leasing. For example, Ring testified that in fact Boyer stated he 
was not concerned with the points brought up by Taylor. [R. 4119-
4121]. Moreover, Boyer testified at trial that he believed 
financing was available. [R. 4843]. 
6. The Middletons claim that in May, 1989, "In an effort 
to mollify" Medical Leasing that The Boyer Company asked Bonneville 
Mortgage Company if financing could be arranged. [Williams & Hunt 
Brief, p. 14]. The evidence was that this request was not made "in 
an effort to mollify" Medical Leasing, but because The Boyer 
Company was anticipating developing a project on the Property. [R. 
5396]. 
7. The Middletons state that Greg Bell advised The Boyer 
Company that, "The proposed transaction was likely too complicated 
to be financed at all." [Williams & Hunt Brief, pp. 14-15; Moyle 
& Draper Brief, pp. 11-12]. However, Mr. Bell admitted at trial, 
inter alia, that he never took the transaction to a lender or 
reviewed any proformas or site plans and that he is not involved 
in the application process or in negotiating financing. Mr. Bell 
The testimony of Boyer cited by Middletons was singularly unpersuasive as counsel simply asked one 
blanket question concerning all the positions taken by counsel in a letter, without asking the witness for 
either his recollection or position with respect to specific statements or issues. 
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further acknowledged that in his letter upon which the Middletons 
rely [Defendants1 Ex. 18] that he had expressed that he did not 
know whether or not lenders would finance the proposed project. 
[R. 5364-5381]. The Middletons also neglect evidence that Boyer 
told Medical Leasing that he did not agree with Mr. Bell's letter. 
[R. 4115-4121, 4422-4424]. 
8. The Middletons state that Boyer contacted Anthony 
Middleton to seek assurance that the Middletons would not sue. 
[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 16]. The evidence was that Boyer did 
not ask Anthony Middleton during that meeting for any assurance 
that the Middletons would not sue, but only wanted to know what the 
Middletons1 opinion was with respect to development of the Property 
by The Boyer Company. [R. 5530-5531]. 
9. The Middletons assert that at a meeting on August 7 or 
8, 1989 that Boyer told Anthony Middleton that Boyer's lawyers were 
of the opinion that the Middletons1 consent to a sublease was 
needed and that Boyer agreed. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 16; Moyle 
& Draper Brief, p. 13]. The Middletons rely solely upon Anthony 
Middleton's testimony while being examined by his attorney. In 
fact, Anthony Middleton could not recall whether this claimed 
statement was made at the August 7 or 8 meeting or at the September 
26, 1989 meeting. [R. 5601-5602]. The jury obviously was not 
bound to accept this self-serving testimony, especially in light 
of the substantial contravening proof which the Middletons failed 
to marshal. [R. 4348-4349, 5601-5603]. 
10. The Middletons relate certain events of the meeting 
between Boyer and Anthony Middleton on August 7 or 8, 1989 by 
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saying, "But Boyer did not tell Anthony the specifics of why his 
lawyer said Middletons1 consent was necessary, nor of the 
concessions necessary to make the sublease financiable."3 What they 
leave out is Anthony Middleton!s own testimony that he issued 
threats of litigation to Boyer at this first meeting stating that 
the Middletons would have to be part of any development project. 
[R. 4353]. 
11. The Middletons claim that Medical Leasing knew during 
the meetings with Anthony Middleton in September, October and 
November, 1989 that he did not have authority to speak for the rest 
of the Middletons, citing pages 4460-4461 of the record. [Moyle 
& Draper Brief, p. 17]. This reference does not support that 
claim. 
12. The Middletons refer to the fact that on November 17, 
1989, Medical Leasing's attorney, Mr. Parsons, wrote to Anthony 
Middleton threatening suit if certain actions were not taken and 
that when Anthony Middleton fs lawyer asked for a copy of the 
proposed sublease to consider approving it, Medical Leasing refused 
to provide it unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for 
more rent and not to sue. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 18; Moyle & 
Draper Brief, p. 18]. In fact, the November 17, 1989 letter also 
demanded that the Middletons withdraw their threats of litigation. 
[Plaintiff's Ex. 39]. The Middletons also ignore that at the very 
time Anthony Middleton fs lawyer was asking for a copy of the 
proposed sublease to supposedly consider approving it, the lawyer 
In that regard, the Middletons confirm that nothing was asked of Anthony Middleton when Boyer first 
spoke with him about the project. 
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already in fact had a copy of the sublease in his possession, 
having received it from Greg Gardner on or about December 22, 1989. 
The Middletons were simply using Medical Leasing's reluctance to 
give them a copy of the sublease as a pretext to refuse consent and 
to continue their threats and demands. [R. 4693-4697; Plaintiff's 
Ex. 43]. 
13. The Middletons argue that the Amended Ground Lease 
provides that a party is not in default until thirty days after 
written notice from the other party specifying the particulars in 
which a party has failed to perform and that no such notice was 
given to any of the Middletons. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 19; 
Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 19]. Both these statements are incorrect. 
The Amended Ground Lease provides that after a party gives a thirty 
day notice of default which is not complied with, that party can 
then incur expenses in performing the defaulting party's duties 
under the agreement. The provision specifically provides that it 
does not preclude any remedies provided by law. [Plaintiff's Ex. 
3]. Moreover, notice was given to Anthony Middleton by letter 
dated November 17, 1989 [Plaintiff's Ex. 39] and to Richard P. 
Middleton and all the other Middletons by letter dated December 8, 
1989, which enclosed a copy of the November 17, 1989 letter. 
[Defendants' Ex. 32]. 
14. The Middletons state that Boyer testified that Medical 
Leasing's attorney never changed his mind about whether the items 
mentioned by Taylor in his March 14, 1989 letter would have to be 
addressed, that he had no recollection of Anthony Middleton 
threatening to sue him or The Boyer Company, and that Boyer agreed 
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with his attorney's letter of February 5, 1990 that Medical Leasing 
had been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the 
landowner in order to make the ground lease financiable. [Moyle 
& Draper Brief, pp. 20-21]. This is entirely misleading and cannot 
withstand even a modest marshaling of the evidence. The Middletons 
ignore the evidence favorable to Medical Leasing which demonstrated 
that Boyer clearly stated that the concerns raised by Taylor were 
not a problem and that the only thing that would keep the deal from 
going forward was Boyer1s concern about litigation from the 
Middletons, that by his own admission Anthony Middleton threatened 
litigation and that the threatened litigation was exactly the 
reason The Boyer Company withdrew from the proposed sublease. 
[See, e.g. , R. 4116-4122, 4531-4536, 4888-4894, 4347-4354, 4271-
4272, 4357-4361; Defendants1 Ex. 27]. 
15. The Middletons remarkably contend that the evidence 
that The Boyer Company did not proceed with the project because 
Medical Leasing "did not provide a ground lease in form suitable 
to Boyer was uncontradicted." [Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 21]. The 
record citations set forth in paragraph 11 above and in paragraphs 
19-27 of Medical Leasingfs Statement of Facts, supra, lay bare this 
frivolous claim. There was, in fact, overwhelming evidence that 
The Boyer Company walked from the transaction solely because of 
the threats of groundless litigation. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence admitted regarding the Zions Litigation 
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was highly relevant and admissible. The evidence was not precluded 
by the terms of the Stipulation and Mutual Release and it 
demonstrated, inter alia, that the groundless threats of litigation 
by Anthony Middleton were known to be groundless even when the 
claims underlying those threats were made in the Zions Litigation. 
Further, the Stipulation and Mutual Release in the Zions Litigation 
had to be introduced because it contained a material amendment to 
the lease. In any case, no evidence of the Zions Litigation was 
admitted to demonstrate liability in connection with the Zions 
claim, the only basis for exclusion under Rule 408 Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Medical Leasing's counsel did not mislead the court with 
respect to the purpose for admitting this evidence. 
2. Written notice to the Middletons was not a precondition 
to filing a suit for damages and, in any case, such notice was 
given. Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease only calls for 
notice before a party can incur expenses to perform the other 
parties' obligation. The paragraph expressly retains all other 
remedies, which includes suits for damages. Moreover, Medical 
Leasing, in fact, gave written notice specifying the harm that 
Anthony Middleton was inflicting upon it and demanding a withdrawal 
of the threats. 
3. There was substantial evidence showing that the 
Middletons breached both the express provisions of paragraph 8 of 
the Amended Ground Lease and the implied obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing. Paragraph 8 clearly allowed Medical Leasing to 
sublease to another entity for the development of the Property and 
the jury found that the groundless threats of litigation issued by 
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Anthony Middleton were made for the express and dominant purpose 
of interfering with that right• The same activities breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the Middletons 
well knew that Medical Leasing had the right to sublease for 
development without their consent. No one asked the Middletons for 
anything before the threats of litigation were issued and they were 
issued with knowledge that the Middletons had no right to 
interfere. All the Middletons share joint liability for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as their liability 
arises from the express provisions of the contract which were 
breached. 
4. The overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the 
Middletons1 wrongful threats of litigation destroyed the 
transaction with The Boyer Company. The Middletons make no effort 
to marshal the evidence which demonstrated that Medical Leasing 
had a reasonable probability that the sublease would be executed 
and that the wrongful threats, made maliciously and intentionally 
by Anthony Middleton for the purpose of sabotaging that 
transaction, had the intended effect. Without having been asked 
for anything, Anthony Middleton knowingly issued threats of 
litigation which were groundless, which The Boyer Company received 
and which caused The Boyer Company to withdraw. 
5. The trial court properly awarded Medical Leasing its 
attorney's fees, in accordance with the stipulation between the 
parties, whether the acts of the Middletons constituted a breach 
of the express terms of the Amended Ground Lease or a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or both. 
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6. The Middletons are jointly liable for the breach of the 
Amended Ground Lease having each signed as the "Landlord11 
undertaking the same obligations and promising the same performance 
to Medical Leasing. 
7. The jury properly awarded Medical Leasing lost profits 
through the remaining term of the Amended Ground Lease in 
accordance with the undisputed evidence which demonstrated that 
Medical Leasing had permanently lost the opportunity to sublease 
the Property for development. Not only did the Middletons fail to 
counter that evidence, they sought to prove by expert testimony 
that Medical Leasing could not sublease the Property for 
development either then or in the future. 
8. The jury verdict that Anthony Middleton tortiously 
interfered with Medical Leasing's prospective relationship with The 
Boyer Company was supported by substantial, if not overwhelming, 
evidence. The evidence, including his own admissions and diary 
entries, showed, and the jury found, that Anthony Middleton 
intentionally and maliciously issued groundless threats of 
litigation for the dominant purpose of destroying the prospective 
business opportunity between Medical Leasing and The Boyer Company. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL REGARDING THE ZIONS 
LITIGATION WAS HIGHLY RELEVANT AND ITS ADMISSION WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, 
The Middletons argue that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by receiving into evidence testimony, pleadings 
and correspondence regarding the previous Zions Litigation because 
this evidence was supposedly inadmissible under the terms of the 
Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims entered into in settlement 
of the Zions Litigation and the case law on the effect of 
settlement agreements.4 The Middletons1 position is without merit. 
In the first place, the Middletons are barred from arguing 
on appeal that this evidence was inadmissible under the terms of 
the settlement stipulation and the case law regarding the effect 
of settlement because that was not the basis upon which they 
objected to the evidence at trial.5 Meyers v. SLC Corp. . 747 P. 2d 
Inconsistently, the Middletons admit that evidence of the Stipulation and Mutual Release, Order of 
Dismissal and Findings of Fact was properly admitted. [Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 22, fn. 13]. It should also 
be noted that it was the Middletons themselves who first referred to the Zions Litigation in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment [R. 454]. The Middletons also introduced evidence at trial concerning the Zions Litigation. 
Prior to trial, the Middletons filed Motions in Limine to exclude evidence of the Zions Litigation 
[R. 1215-1221], asserting only that the evidence was irrelevant and that the final judgment in the Zions 
Litigation was res judicata and the "pleadings, claims and circumstances" of that case "merged into a final 
judgment and order." CR. 1215-1221]. Judge Rigtrup denied the motions. At trial, the only objection raised 
by the Middletons to evidence of the Zions Litigation was irrelevance. [See, e.g., R. 4038 and 4042]. Mr. Hunt 
later objected to the admission of the Third Party Complaint filed on behalf of Anthony and George Middleton 
and the Answer and Counterclaim filed by the other Middletons in the Zions Litigation [Plaintiff's Exs. 11 and 
15] on the additional basis that those specific pleadings were irrelevant and had been merged into the final 
judgment. 
Finally, long after all parties had introduced evidence concerning the Zions Litigation, Mr. Palmer 
moved to strike all of that evidence on the basis that the evidence was irrelevant and "potentially inflammatory 
with the jury." [R. 5101-5102]. 
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1058, 1060 (Utah App. 1987); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984); Gaulden v. Burlington Northern. Inc.. 654 
P.2d 383, 393 (Kan. 1982). 
More importantly, the evidence was highly relevant. 
Medical Leasing contended that the Middletons intentionally and in 
bad faith interfered with Medical Leasing1s relationship with The 
Boyer Company by making threats of groundless litigation based upon 
claims that they were entitled to participate in any future 
development. 
To prove these contentions, Medical Leasing introduced 
evidence that the Middletons had made the very same claims when 
Medical Leasing proposed to sublease a portion of the Property to 
Zions, including claims that the Amended Ground Lease was ambiguous 
regarding whether their consent was necessary and that, in fact, 
their consent was required. The evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that the Middletons knew full well at the time they 
were litigating the Zions case that their claims were groundless. 
[See, e.g. , R. 4013-4020, 5031-5032, 5693-5700, 4324-4338, 5578-
5584]. After Judge Billings ruled on summary judgment that the 
Middletons1 consent was not required, the parties ultimately in 
1985 settled all disputes in the Zions Litigation by way of a 
Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims and Order of Dismissal, 
one of the basic purposes of which was to make crystal clear the 
already clear and well understood language of paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Ground Lease that consent was not required for further 
development of the Property by an independent third party. 
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In this connection, the Stipulation and Mutual Release in 
the Zions Litigation had to be introduced into evidence below 
because paragraph 5 of that document modified paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Ground Lease as follows: 
Consent of the Middletons to the future development 
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the 
Lessee shall seek to develop the property or an 
independent sublessee or assignee requires that the 
interest of the Middletons be subordinated to the 
interest of a development lender. In other words, 
the lessee may not develop the property without the 
consent of the Middletons, but a third party 
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the 
lessee may further develop the property without the 
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed 
capital provided subordination of the interest of 
the Middletons is not required for said 
development. 
[Plaintifffs Ex. 16] . 
The evidence concerning the Zions Litigation was not 
introduced below to show that the Middletons were liable for the 
claims made in the Zions Litigation, which is the only purpose 
for which Rule 4 08 of the Utah Rules of Evidence would have 
prohibited introduction of that evidence. See, e.g., Bituminous 
Const., Inc. v. Rucker Enterprises, Inc., 816 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 
1987) ; Wiener v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, 759 F. Supp. 
510, 521 (E.D.Ark. 1991); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th Cir. 1983); Skonberg v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28, 34 (111. App. 
1991); Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. App. 1991); 
Bulaich v. AT&T Information Systems, 778 P.2d 1031, 1036-37 
(Wash. 1989). The Middletons1 notion that by settling their 
groundless claims in one lawsuit they can prevent evidence 
thereof in a second lawsuit on the issues of knowledge, intent 
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and purpose flies in the face not only of the specific language 
of Rule 408 permitting such evidence, but of common sense. 
Further, the Middletons1 contention that the language of 
the Stipulation and Mutual Release of Claims barred Medical 
Leasing from introducing this evidence is wrong. There is no 
such language. Nor do the cases cited by the Middletons support 
their position. Not one of those cases holds that the mere fact 
that the parties signed a release of claims in settlement of 
litigation bars evidence concerning that litigation in future 
litigation on other claims.6 
Finally, the Middletons1 charge that Medical Leasing's 
counsel misled Judge Rigtrup at the commencement of the trial 
concerning the purpose for the admission of evidence relating 
to the Zions Litigation is not only insulting, it is 
disingenuous. The Middletons take out of context a passage from 
the transcript in which Medical Leasing's counsel stated to the 
court that he wanted to make it clear that no claims were being 
made in this litigation relating to the Zions Litigation and 
that "we are simply trying to show what the contentions are so 
For example, in Kirby v. Dole, 736 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1984), cited by the Middletons, the Eleventh 
Circuit merely held that the employees decision to invoke the term of the settlement agreement permitting him 
one remedy necessarily precluded him from asserting whatever other remedies might have been available. The 
case had nothing to do with the admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings. 
In Rasmussen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 726 P.2d 1251 (Wash.App. 1986), cited by the Middletons, 
the insurance company for a car rental agency settled a claim with an injured passenger. The release included 
a release of any claims for underinsured motorist benefits. The court simply held that the release was binding 
on the issue of the scope of coverage in subsequent litigation between the rental car insurer and the 
passenger's insurance company. Again, there was no issue concerning the admissibility of evidence in subsequent 
litigation. 
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we can understand what was settled."7 The Middletons neglect to 
bring to the court's attention that this statement was made only 
with respect to the introduction of Exhibit 10, the complaint 
filed by Zions against the Middletons and Medical Leasing, and 
only after the exhibit had been admitted and the jury had been 
cautioned by the court that the allegations of the Complaint had 
not been proven. As the Middletons well know, that statement 
was not intended as an exhaustive list of the reasons for which 
all evidence concerning the Zions Litigation would be 
introduced.8 Judge Rigtrup was not misled; he was well informed 
and ruled correctly. 
In short, evidence concerning the Zions Litigation was 
not introduced to prove that the Middletons were liable for the 
claims made in the Zions Litigation. This evidence, together 
with all the other evidence presented at trial, persuasively 
demonstrated that the Middletons knew very well that the 
litigation threatened by Anthony Middleton was groundless and 
that the repeat of the same threats of groundless litigation as 
were made in the Zions Litigation was an intentional wrong, 
justifying not only compensatory, but punitive damages. 
The Middletons cite page 4115 of the record in error. In fact, this statement is contained at page 4039 
of the record. 
In fact, both the court and counsel had well in mind the arguments made by Medical Leasing's 
counsel in opposition to the Middletons' Motion in Limine to exclude this evidence which were set forth at 
length in Medical Leasing's memorandum in opposition to the Motion in Limine. CR. 1242, 1246-1250]. Medical 
Leasing argued the evidence was admissible at that time on the same basis that Medical Leasing now contends the 
evidence was admissible. 
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B. MEDICAL LEASING WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GIVE WRITTEN 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT IN ORDER TO RECOVER DAMAGES AND, IN ANY EVENT, 
SUFFICIENT NOTICE WAS GIVEN, 
The Middletons attempt to avoid the judgment entered 
against them by raising the argument that Medical Leasing was 
barred from bringing suit because Medical Leasing purportedly 
failed to give written notice of default which the Middletons 
say was required under paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease 
and under the law. The Middletons are wrong on both counts. 
1. Notice Was Not a Condition Precedent. 
First, the law is clear that absent an express 
contractual provision making the giving of notice a condition 
precedent to filing suit, no notice is necessary. See, e.g. , 
Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 190 A.2d 369, 373-74 (N.J. 
1973); S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 727 
at 395 (3rd Ed. 1957). Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease 
in the present case contains no such provision.9 
Paragraph 6 of the Amended Ground Lease provides: 
Paragraph 6. Default. A party shall be deemed 
to be in default upon the expiration of thirty (30) 
days from the date of written notice from the other 
party specifying the particulars in which such party 
The Middletons note that earlier in this case Medical Leasing unsuccessfully sought to exclude evidence 
of Middletons' attorney's fees on the basis that since no notice of default had been given by the Middletons, 
Medical Leasing could not be a "defaulting party." That argument, which was rejected by the court, related to 
the specific definition of "defaulting party" under the attorney's fee provision of paragraph 16. Further, the 
Middletons do not point out to the court that their understanding of paragraphs 6 and 16 has changed. In 
response to Medical Leasing's Motion in Limine, they argued that paragraph 6 did not bar them from recovery of 
attorney's fees even if no notice had been given, and further that their pleadings in this lawsuit constituted 
sufficient notice under paragraph 6. [R. 1261-1264], 
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has failed to perform the obligations of this Lease 
unless that party, prior to the expiration of said 
thirty (30) days, has rectified the particulars 
specified in the notice. Upon such default occurring, 
the defaulting party may incur any expenses necessary 
to perform the obligation of the other party as 
specified in such notice, and if the defaulting party 
is the landlord, tenant may deduct such expenses from 
the rents thereafter to become due. If the defaulting 
party is the tenant, landlord may decree the term 
ended and enter the Leased Premises with or without 
process of law. The remedies in this article 
conferred do not exclude any other remedies provided 
in the Lease or by law. [Emphasis added]. 
As Judge Rigtrup found, the clear import of paragraph 6 is 
only to require written notice of default before the non-defaulting 
party may incur expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the 
other party as specified in the notice or before the Middletons 
could terminate the lease. Those are the only remedies so 
conditioned. Paragraph 6 clearly states that it does not "exclude 
any other remedies provided in the Lease or by law.11 No provision 
of the Amended Ground Lease requires formal written notice of 
default before commencement of a suit for damages. 
The Middletons argue that a contract should be interpreted 
so as to harmonize all of its provisions, a truism with which 
Medical Leasing agrees. Having said this, the Middletons then 
attempt to interpret paragraph 6 in such a manner as to entirely 
read out of the lease the last sentence of the paragraph. The 
language of the lease and specifically paragraph 6 is readily 
harmonized by only requiring that a party give a written notice of 
default before a party seeks to hold the other party responsible 
for expenses incurred by the non-breaching party in performing the 
breaching partyfs obligations or before the landlord terminates the 
lease. 
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The Middletons rely on Bentley v. Potter, 694 P. 2d 617 
(Utah 1984), to support their notice argument. Bentley is not on 
point because, unlike the present case, there the lease clearly 
required a written notice of default before the lease could be 
terminated. The Middletons1 reliance on Hadlock v. Showcase Real 
Estate, Inc. , 680 P.2d 395 (Utah 1984), is similarly misplaced. 
In Hadlock, paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
specifically required five days prior written notice before the 
seller could forfeit the buyer's interest in the property. Again, 
there is no such requirement in the case at bar. 
Unable to find any case law to support their argument that 
notice was required, the Middletons seek to rely upon § 7.1 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Property. All that section states is that 
if a landlord fails to perform certain promises contained in a 
lease after being requested to do so by the tenant, then the tenant 
has specific remedies. That section has nothing to do with the 
circumstances of this case. Moreover, that section does not 
require written notice from a tenant and the record is replete with 
evidence that both Boyer and Medical Leasing orally requested 
Anthony Middleton to acknowledge Medical Leasingfs right to 
sublease to Boyer. 
Finally, it would be folly to bar Medical Leasing from suit 
for lack of notice where the Middletons made no effort to retract 
their litigation threats after suit was filed and they were 
undeniably on notice of their default. Any perceived lack of 
notice made no difference. 
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2. In Any Event, Medical Leasing Gave Notice. 
Furthermore, even if written notice had been required, the 
plain fact of the matter is that Medical Leasing did give the 
Middletons the very notice they assert they were entitled to 
receive. The Middletons argue that Medical Leasing was required 
to give that notice in writing to Richard P. Middleton, who was the 
individual to whom rent was payable. On November 17, 1989, Medical 
Leasingfs attorney, Mr. Parsons, sent Anthony Middleton a letter 
demanding, among other things, that the threats of litigation 
against The Boyer Company be withdrawn. [Plaintiff's Ex. 39]. 
Thereafter, on December 8, 1989, Parsons sent a copy of the 
November 17 letter to Richard P. Middleton (the very individual 
whom the Middletons now contend was required to be given notice) 
requesting that he forward copies to all of the Middletons. 
[Defendants' Ex. 32]. Notwithstanding this notice, and the 
numerous communications between counsel and the parties, the 
Middletons refused to withdraw their threats of litigation either 
within thirty days or thereafter. 
In short, the Middletons1 attempt to hide behind the lack 
of a formal written notice of default is not supported by the 
provisions of the lease, the applicable law or the facts, and was 
properly rejected by the trial court. 
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C. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE MIDDLETONS 
BREACHED PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE AND THEIR IMPLIED 
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The Middletons insist that the judgment below was erroneous 
because they did not breach the express provisions of paragraph 8 
of the Amended Ground Lease or the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and that, in any event, a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing does not give rise to joint liability. 
These arguments are made out of whole cloth. 
Initially, it should be noted that here, as elsewhere in 
their briefs, the Middletons attempt to attack the sufficiency of 
the evidence below without complying with their obligation to 
marshal all of the evidence and inferences supporting the judgment 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the judgment. That failure is grounds alone to affirm the 
judgment. See, e.g. , Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 
(Utah 1992); Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). 
1. There Was Substantial Evidence that the Middletons 
Breached the Provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease. 
Paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease as restated in the 
stipulation for settlement in the Zions Litigation provides: 
[C]onsent of the Middletons to the future development 
of the Leased Premises is not required unless the 
Lessee shall seek to develop the property or an 
independent third party sublessee or assignee requires 
that the interest of the Middletons be subordinated 
to the interest of a development lender. In other 
words, the lessee may not develop the property without 
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the consent of the Middletons, but a third party 
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the 
lessee may further develop the property without the 
consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed 
capital provided subordination of the interest of the 
Middletons is not required for said development. 
Incredibly, the Middletons now assert that because no 
affirmative action was required from the Middletons under paragraph 
8 that the Middletons did not, under paragraph 8, "promise to do 
anything and they did not promise not to do anything." Thus, so 
say the Middletons, they could not have breached the express 
provisions of paragraph 8. This argument is pure sophistry. 
The Middletons agreed in paragraph 8 that Medical Leasing 
could sublease the property to an independent third party such as 
The Boyer Company to develop without further compensation and 
without any consent from the Middletons. In direct contravention 
to and breach of paragraph 8, Anthony Middleton maliciously 
threatened groundless suit to stop the development unless the 
Middletons received tribute. Anthony Middleton's conduct in 
attempting to stop the development breached the Middletons1 
affirmative agreement that Medical Leasing could sublease the 
property to a third party for development. The situation is no 
different in principle than if the Middletons had agreed to allow 
development of the Property and then destroyed the buildings 
constructed. Would the Middletons defend by insisting they had not 
affirmatively agreed to do or not to do anything? Understandably, 
the Middletons can find neither logic nor case authority to support 
their position. 
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2. There Was Substantial Evidence that the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Was Breached, 
Perhaps the most frivolous argument made by the Middletons 
on this appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to show that 
there was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing because Anthony Middleton's conduct in threatening Medical 
Leasing with suit for more rent "was consistent with both parties1 
expectations that to get further consent or lease changes, more 
rent had to be paid . . . " [Moyle & Draper Brief, p. 45]. This 
argument is a gross distortion of the record. 
The language of paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease as 
restated in the settlement stipulation in the Zions Litigation 
quoted above is absolutely clear that Medical Leasing was entitled 
to sublease the Property to an independent third party developer 
such as The Boyer Company for development without the consent of 
the Middletons and without compensation so long as no subordination 
was requested. Anthony Middleton himself, in his August 6, 1989 
diary entry, demonstrated his understanding of that fact: 
Roger's company is so strong that they can do without 
subordination and I suspect we are dead in the water 
the way that stupid contract is put together by Uncle 
Dick and William Morel . . . [M]y strong hunch is that 
we are sunk and will have to live with the idea that 
those birds will derive a very handsome income off the 
development without actually including the actual 
owners of the land at all. 
[Plaintiff's Ex. 37]. 
Indeed, Anthony Middleton never contended that under the 
Amended Ground Lease the Middletons1 consent was necessary; he 
simply asserted the Middletons1 philosophical belief that they were 
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entitled to compensation and would litigate unless they got it. 
The evidence also demonstrated that the other Middletons, including 
George, Richard P. and Richard G., all understood that their 
consent was not necessary and they were not entitled to 
compensation. What the evidence proved was that the Middletons 
did not like the bargain they had made in the Amended Ground Lease 
and were bound and determined not to honor it. 
It is well settled in Utah that a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is implied in contractual relationships. This 
covenant requires that the parties act in good faith to achieve 
the purposes of the contract and not purposely do anything to 
deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract. See, 
e.g., St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 
(Utah 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 
(Utah 1989); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
311 (Utah 1982). 
The Middletons argue that Anthony Middleton's threats were 
justified because Boyer supposedly told him that Boyer's lawyer 
said the Middletons1 consent was required and therefore that 
Anthony Middleton at the time he made the threats believed the 
Middletons would at a later date be requested to give some 
concession or change the Amended Ground Lease. This argument is 
unavailing for at least three reasons. First, Anthony Middleton 
actually testified that the basis for his threats was a 
"philosophical belief" that the Middletons should get a cut of 
future development and had nothing to do with whether requests were 
or were not made of them. Second, with the substantial conflict 
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in his testimony, the jury was not required to nor did it believe 
all or any portion of Anthony Middleton's testimony. Third, no one 
asked Anthony for any concessions before he started making his 
threats of litigation and, in fact, it was made clear to Anthony 
that no concessions were being requested. The Middletons attempt 
in this regard to distort Dr. Wong's testimony that it was his 
expectation that if Medical Leasing asked for consent or changes 
from the Middletons that the Middletons would ask for more rent. 
The plain truth of the matter is that Medical Leasing did not 
believe the Middletons1 consent to development was necessary and 
did not ask for any consent or changes from the Middletons before 
the transaction with The Boyer Company was sabotaged by the 
litigation threats. 
Finally, the Middletons argue that if consent was not 
necessary, then Medical Leasing and Boyer had no "business 
approaching Anthony on the subject to make the specious "request 
for assurance of no suit . . . '" and that this request caused 
Anthony to be suspicious and to threaten suit. [Moyle & Draper 
Brief, p. 45]. That, of course, is argument for the jury, which 
rejected it. The jury found that Anthony Middleton knew very well 
consent was not required and intentionally sabotaged the 
transaction. Of course, Medical Leasing did not approach Anthony 
to request an assurance that the Middletons would not sue. Nor did 
Boyer. Boyer was aware, however, of the previous Zions Litigation 
and because of concerns prompted thereby simply inquired of Anthony 
Middleton concerning the Middletons1 feelings on further 
development. And there was no evidence presented that before 
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Anthony Middleton issued the threats Boyer asked for assurances the 
Middletons would not sue. Beyond that, the Middletons were not 
sued because they refused to give an assurance that they would not 
commence a lawsuit. They were sued because Anthony Middleton 
affirmatively threatened groundless litigation, thereby destroying 
the transaction with The Boyer Company. 
3. The Middletons Are Jointly Liable for the Breach of 
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The Middletons represented by Moyle & Draper argue that 
even if the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached 
by Anthony Middleton, that such a breach would not impose joint 
liability on the remaining Middletons. They quote from 3A Corbin 
on Contracts, § 654A (1991 Pocket Part at 81), that the obligation 
of good faith is "constructive" rather than "implied" and cite § 
205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, that the covenant is 
imposed upon each party to the contract, to argue that unlike other 
breaches of contract, the breach of the obligation of good faith 
does not impose joint liability. This argument is a non sequitur. 
The authorities relied upon by the Middletons have absolutely 
nothing to do with this issue. In this regard, Cluff v. Culmer, 
556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), cited by the Middletons, provides no 
support whatsoever. That case, although holding both sellers of 
real estate liable for an implied covenant against waste (without 
any reference to who actually committed it) , contains no discussion 
at all of joint liability. 
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The Middletons have cited no cases for the proposition that 
the rules of joint liability for breach of contract are any 
different for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
than any other breach and Medical Leasing has, not surprisingly, 
been unable to find any such cases. The law imposes the obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing as part of the contract between the 
parties. The covenant has to do with how the parties perform their 
obligations under the contract. As will be demonstrated later [pp. 
73 to 83], all of the Middletons, as the Landlord under the Amended 
Ground Lease, are jointly liable for the breach of that contract. 
It would be illogical to treat the breach of this covenant any 
different from other breaches of contract. 
D. THE EVIDENCE WAS OVERWHELMING THAT THE MIDDLETONS1 
WRONGFUL THREATS OF LITIGATION DESTROYED THE TRANSACTION WITH THE 
BOYER COMPANY. 
The Middletons once again raise the evidentiary argument, 
soundly rejected by both the jury and the court below, that there 
is no substantial evidence that Anthony Middleton's threats of 
litigation were the cause of The Boyer Company's refusal to go 
forward with the sublease of the Property. Rather, the Middletons 
posit, the real reason The Boyer Company refused to go forward was 
that it supposedly could not obtain financing for development 
without concessions from the Middletons which the Middletons were 
not required to give under their Amended Ground Lease with Medical 
Leasing. This question of causation was a question of fact for the 
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jury and the jury found from a preponderance of the evidence 
against the Middletons. 
In reasserting this argument on appeal, the Middletons 
attempt to reduce the body of evidence to small selected bits of 
testimony, all removed from context, and for the most part 
immaterial to the point. At the same time, the Middletons ignore 
all the remaining testimony given at trial, failing once again to 
marshal the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom supporting the jury's verdict. 
In order to recover damages from the Middletons, Medical 
Leasing was not required to prove beyond any doubt that it would 
have entered into a sublease with Boyer for development of the 
Property or that Anthony Middleton's wrongful threats of litigation 
were the sole proximate cause of Boyerfs decision not to go forward 
with the project. Rather, Medical Leasing was only required to 
demonstrate that absent the wrongful threats there was a reasonable 
probability that a sublease would have been executed and that the 
wrongful threats were a substantial factor in Boyerfs decision not 
to go forward with the project. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal 
Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979); Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 
Etc., 653 P.2d 638, 643 (Wash. App. 1982); Prosser & Keeton on The 
Law of Torts, § 129 at 989 (5th Ed. 1984). As this Court remarked 
in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 
1982) : 
The tort of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations reaches beyond 
protection of an interest in an existing contract and 
protects a party's interest in prospective 
relationships of economic advantage not yet reduced 
to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to be) . 
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To illustrate the point, Anthony Middletonfs testimony 
(which the Middletons understandably ignore), on its own, 
establishes causation. Anthony Middleton1s diary [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 37] demonstrated that when Boyer first told him about the 
proposed development, Anthony Middleton understood Boyer could 
develop the Property without subordination and was angry because 
"those birds will derive a very handsome income off the development 
without actually including the actual owners of the land at all." 
Moreover, Anthony Middleton1s diary entry and testimony on these 
issues make no reference to Boyer or Medical Leasing requiring 
concessions from the Middletons. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 37; R. 
4376]. The same evidence makes clear that Boyer still believed the 
deal was very alive at that time. 
Anthony Middleton admitted that he told Boyer that there 
would be litigation if the Middletons were not compensated, 
probably at a meeting he had with Boyer on August 7 or 8, 1989, 
but certainly at a meeting held on September 26, 1989 with Boyer, 
Dr. Ring and Dr. Wong. [R. 4353-4354, 5606-5609]. Anthony 
Middleton further admitted that Boyer told himf both at the August 
and September meetings, that he was not interested in doing the 
development if the Middletons were going to sue. [R. 4353-4354, 
4358-4361]. Tony Middleton's diary entry concerning the September 
26, 1989 meeting [Plaintiff's Exhibit 37] states: 
At any rate, we got the point made since then that the 
only thing we are interested in is increasing the 
income realized from the property in return for which 
the Middleton family will agree not to challenge the 
contract in court. 
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[R. 5618-5619]. As in previous meetings, that meeting involved no 
reference to concessions or to Boyer or Medical Leasing needing 
anything from the Middletons. In fact, the phrase "challenge the 
contract in court" presumes, as Anthony Middleton anticipated, that 
a contract would be entered into between The Boyer Company and 
Medical Leasing without the requirement of any consent by the 
Middletons. The only way Anthony Middleton could attempt to stop 
it was to threaten a groundless suit. 
George Middleton admitted that Anthony told him that Boyer 
wanted to develop the Property but was afraid of protracted legal 
problems and therefore the project was on hold. [R. 4951-4952]. 
Drs. Ring and Wong both testified that Anthony Middleton 
threatened Boyer with litigation at meetings on September 26, 
1989 and November 11, 1989 (when Boyer said he was in a 
"litigation box") , and that on more than one occasion Boyer said 
he was not interested in attempting to develop the Property with 
threats of litigation. [R. 4126-4138, 4144, 4147, 4182, 4890-
4891, 4920, 4926]. Dr. Ring testified that at the September 26, 
1989 meeting Boyer told Anthony Middleton that he had reviewed 
the Amended Ground Lease as modified by the Zions stipulation 
and told him that the documents seemed clear that the 
Middletons1 consent to development was not required. Anthony 
replied, "Well, I don't think that makes any difference. If a 
stake goes in the ground, the Middletons will sue." Anthony 
reiterated two or three times that the Middletons had a 
philosophical right to more income and that if they didnft get 
it, they would sue. These threats were made even though there 
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was no request for concessions from the Middletons at the 
meeting. Dr. Ring testified that after the threats were made at 
that meeting that discussions continued thereafter, but the 
parties never went back to discussing the original deal again. 
After that, the focus related to the threats of litigation. [R. 
412 6-4133]. This testimony was not contradicted either by 
Anthony Middleton or Boyer. 
Further, the Middletons1 suggestion that it was the 
concerns expressed in Taylor's March 14, 1989 letter that 
prevented the deal from going forward is contrary to, inter 
alia, the specific testimony of Dr. Ring. Dr. Ring testified 
that at the July 25, 1989 meeting, attended both by Boyer and 
Taylor, they discussed the concerns of Taylor and Greg Bell 
about financing. The concerns set forth in Taylor's March 14, 
1989 letter were being discussed when Boyer said that, "Those 
problems can be dealt with, don't pay any attention to his 
attorney, it was not a point of issue", "that's not important, 
we don't need to deal with that. We can work around that. 
Let's get — go ahead and make this deal" and "I came here to 
make a deal, I didn't come here to break one." Boyer said his 
major concern was he did not want to get in a litigation box the 
way Zions had gotten themselves into it. Boyer said if Zions 
could get financing so could The Boyer Company and that he had 
read Greg Bell's letter concerning financing, but did not agree 
with it. Boyer said, "The only thing that I can see that's 
going to stop this project at this point is this concern of — 
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mv concern of the threat of litigation." Boyer never mentioned 
financing. [R. 4115-4121 and 4422-4424]. 
Boyer did not even recall reading Taylor's March 14 
letter before it was sent. Boyer never allowed the deal to 
pivot on financing or Taylor's concerns. Dr. Ring made it 
perfectly clear at the July 25, 1989 meeting that no one, 
including Boyer, was to seek any concessions from the 
Middletons. [R. 4120-4122, 4529-4532, 4590, 4596-4598, 4640]. 
Anthony Middleton himself confirmed that Medical Leasing was not 
asking for any concessions. [R. 5592]. Parsons confirmed in 
detail Dr. Ring's testimony about the July 25, 1989 meeting and 
specifically concerning Boyer's statements. [R. 4530-4532]. 
In fact, Taylor had little to do with the transaction. 
He was not involved in any of the negotiations on the 
Development Agreement, did not look at any of the pleadings in 
the Zions litigation and drafted his March 14, 1989 letter based 
on an outdated version of the Amended Ground Lease. [R. 4507-
4508, 5451-5456, 5485-5486]. Although the Middletons place 
great importance on the so-called "business hurdles" that Taylor 
articulated in his March 14, 1989 letter, Taylor himself could 
not and did not testify that those concerns ultimately killed 
the deal. Taylor admitted under cross-examination that he did 
not know why Boyer decided to pull out of the deal. [R. 5491-
5502]. Furthermore, Dr. Ring testified that at the end of the 
July 25, 1989 meeting Boyer said that The Boyer Company needed 
nothing from the Middletons in order to develop the Property and 
that at the September 26, 1989 meeting Boyer indicated he was 
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not following Taylors advice. Simply put, Taylor was out of 
the loop with respect to negotiations long before Anthony 
Middleton's threats torpedoed the deal. [R. 5486-5497]. 
Perhaps the most telling indication of the 
insignificance of Taylor's input into the deal was offered by 
Greg Gardner when he was being questioned by Mr. Frankenburg 
about his review of Plaintiff's Ex. 33, the working draft of the 
sublease which he had discussed with Boyer. After testifying 
that he couldn't recall if he recommended that Boyer should sign 
the documents he was asked: "Q. Would it be fair to say that 
you relied upon The Boyer Company's attorney [Taylor] to make 
that determination, isn't it? A. For the boilerplate language, 
yes. For the business points, I would rely on myself and Roger 
[Boyer] for that." [R. 4791-4792]. Henry Schwendiman placed 
Taylor's input in the transaction in a similar perspective when 
Schwendiman testified that the documentation was maybe only 
l/100th of a part of the issues that lenders look at when 
determining to finance a transaction and that a lender looks at 
the strength of the borrower and their track record, the other 
deals they have developed, the quality of past developments, the 
type of tenants they can attract, the location of the proposed 
project, the quality of construction, the parking situation and 
similar matters. [R. 5146-5147]. 
The evidence at trial, including Boyer's own testimony, 
demonstrated that throughout 1989 Boyer was proceeding in good 
faith towards an agreement for development of the Property. [R. 
4871, 4885]. For example, in a June 27, 1989 telephone 
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conversation with John Parsons, long after Taylor's letter, Greg 
Gardner affirmed that Boyer most definitely remained interested 
in the Property and Boyer still intended to go forward with the 
project. [R. 4528]. Parsons testified in this regard: 
Mr. Hunt: And then the next paragraph — I guess 
you've asked him: "Do you want the deal?" and he 
says, "Yes, without a doubt?" 
A. Well, before that, I told him that my clients 
wouldn't pay any money to Middletons and then I asked 
him, "Do you want to deal?" and he said, "Yes, without 
a doubt, this is the best available corner in town." 
[R. 4583]. Parsons also testified that as of that time the deal 
was finished and moving forward except for Boyer's meeting with the 
Middletons to obtain comfort with respect to possible litigation 
from the Middletons. [R. 4535-4536]. 
It was not until September 26, 1989 when Anthony Middleton 
pressed home his threats of litigation that serious doubts were 
cast on the viability on the deal. Until that time, Medical 
Leasing had not reached any impasse with Boyer. [R. 4300]. The 
threats at the September 26th meeting derailed the negotiations. 
After that time, the discussions centered on the threats and 
different proposals to get around the threats. [R. 4132-4133]. 
The Middletons argue that the testimony of Parsons and Drs. 
Ring and Wong concerning Boyer's statements to them are "rank 
hearsay." This argument misses the point. To the extent that the 
testimony was hearsay, the court correctly found it admissible 
under well recognized exceptions, including Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rules 803(1) (present sense impression) and (3) (state of mind 
including, intent, plan and motive), as it was introduced to show 
Boyer's state of mind and his intent with respect to going forward 
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with the sublease.10 Consequently, Boyer1s statements were perfectly 
admissible. 
The Middletons argue that at trial Boyer testified he could 
not remember one way or the other the threats of litigation so that 
must prove the real reason that Boyer did not go forward with 
development of the project was the concerns expressed by Taylor in 
his March 14, 1989 letter. Again, the evidence was otherwise. 
It is important to recognize at the outset that the jury 
was not bound to believe Boyer's testimony that he could not 
remember whether Anthony Middleton had threatened litigation. 
Boyer admitted that he and Anthony Middleton were long-time friends 
who were both involved as leaders of their stake in the L.D.S. 
church. Boyer was at best a reluctant witness with a convenient 
and almost total memory lapse concerning the transactions. 
Moreover, it is important that Boyer did not deny that threats of 
litigation had been made, but only said he could not remember one 
way or another whether there were threats. And, Boyer admitted 
that he may have told Anthony Middleton he was not interested in 
developing the Property if litigation would be involved and that 
threats of litigation would chill development of the Property. [R. 
4863-4864]. Boyer clearly testified that if litigation had been 
Even if the hearsay exception had not been available, the statements were necessary predicates to 
explain Anthony Middleton's threats in response to the statements, for which use the statements would not be 
offered for the truth of the matters stated and therefore would not be hearsay. 
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threatened he would not have been interested in proceeding with 
the project. [R. 4872-4873]." 
In addition, Boyer obviously understood at the November 
11, 1989 meeting that if the deal went forward there would be 
litigation. [R. 5623-5627; Defendants1 Exhibit 27]. There is no 
question but that Boyer knew he had been threatened by Anthony 
Middleton because his statements acknowledging that fact are 
reflected in the tape transcript of the November 11, 1989 meeting. 
[Defendants1 Exhibit D-27]. In that respect, page 32 of Exhibit 
D-27 records the following conversation: 
Mr. Boyer: We will litigate. We will be willing 
to litigate and prepared to litigate the status quo 
if we know we're going to be litigating anyway. We're 
now in a litigation box. We go forward we litigate, 
we go backward we litigate. 
Mr. Ring: Is that your impression? 
Mr. Boyer: I thought that's what both of you 
said. That's the implication. He said we would 
litigate if they don't participate, and you suggested 
that I think we have a binding agreement. 
Mr. Ring: I think we do. 
Mr. Boyer: What my point is, if we don't proceed 
I think the implication is we litigate. If we did 
proceed, the implication is we litigate. 
Further, page 18 of Exhibit D-27 records the following 
exchange between Dr. Ring and Anthony Middleton in front of Boyer: 
Dr. Ring: As a matter of fact, as you said right 
off the bat, you said it then and you said at every 
meeting we've had, is that if any development happens 
out there, we're going to sue. 
In that regard Boyer testified: 
"Q. And if going forward with this development meant being involved, at all, in litigation with 
the Middletons, would it be your determination not to go forward7 
A. That's correct, we would not regardless of our friendship. 
Q. In other words, litigation itself would be threatening enough? 
A. Yes." [R. 4872]. 
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Anthony Middleton: No. That's only half of what 
I said. There would be — very likely be — a suit 
entered if zero participation on the part of the 
owners. 
A transcript of a February 15, 1990 meeting also plainly 
evidences that Boyer was backing away from the sublease because of 
Anthony Middleton's threats. At the February 15, 1990 meeting at 
Boyer's office, shortly after Taylor's February 5, 1990 letter 
announcing Boyer had no further interest in pursuing the project, 
Boyer stated: 
Well, we had, you know, Tony, he's called a 
couple of times. In fact, he called me I think it was 
last week and told me, I guess the essence of his 
comment was, I feel more strongly about the strength 
of my position, that almost is a direct quote, than 
I have ever before, after having gotten into this, 
which I honestly don't know how he could arrive at 
that conclusion, but that is his conclusion. 
We had a discussion with Vic and he has 
suggested, and I don't know, it may have even been 
sent, but we are sending you a letter saying, look, 
this is a draft of it, saying, look, get your act 
together, when we can make a deal let's talk about a 
deal. In the meantime, we're kind of stepping back. 
[Defendants' Exhibit 58 at 4].12 
Although the Middletons now want to argue about whether 
Anthony Middleton's threats caused Boyer to walk from the 
transaction, the evidence was beyond question that was exactly the 
12 
The Middletons point to Taylor's letter of February 5, 1990 in which Taylor notified Medical Leasing 
that Boyer was no longer interested in pursuing the project as proof that Boyer refused to go forward with the 
project because the concessions mentioned in Taylor's previous letter had not been obtained. At best, Taylor's 
letter was ambiguous in this regard. Interpreting the letter in the light most favorable to Medical Leasing, 
the letter totally supports Medical Leasing's theory that the Middletons' refusal to assure Boyer he would not 
be sued was what destroyed the deal. But, even if the letter is construed as meaning what the Middletons say 
it does, the jury was not bound to believe that the reasons asserted by Taylor in his letter were the real 
reasons for Boyer's decision not to go forward, especially when Taylor testified he didn't know why The Boyer 
Company pulled out. Obviously, as of February, 1990, Boyer was attempting to avoid any potential claim by 
Medical Leasing. Taylor's letter is also contradicted by the evidence of Boyer's own statement as to why Boyer 
did not proceed. 
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result Anthony Middleton intended unless Medical Leasing 
surrendered to his demands for more money. He knew from his 
earlier experience with the Zions litigation that by threatening 
litigation he could forestall development. [R. 4340-4341]. In 
fact, he wrote in his diary of his intention to forestall and, if 
necessary, to block development by litigation. [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 37; R. 4344-4347]. Anthony Middleton even reminded Boyer 
that timing was critical in financing a commercial development and 
that outside of the appropriate time window it would become 
increasingly difficult for Boyer to get financing. [R. 5628]. 
Both Medical Leasing1s and the Middletons' expert testimony 
confirmed the disastrous effect that threats of litigation would 
have on a proposed transaction. [R. 5099-5100, 5118-5119, 5325-
5326]. In short, Anthony Middleton's threats had exactly the 
intended result. 
The jury heard all the evidence and obviously refused to 
accept the Middletons' theory that the reason Boyer refused to go 
forward with the project related to concerns about financing 
expressed in Taylor's March 14, 1989 letter. The jury's reaction 
was not surprising in view of the overwhelming evidence that the 
only reason Boyer walked from the Property was because of Anthony 
Middleton's litigation threats.13 The Middletons were asking the 
jury to believe that despite the enormous work that Greg Gardner 
testified The Boyer Company had done with respect to the project 
over a period of over two years, including getting the Property 
Of course, Medical Leasing's burden respecting causation was only to show that the threats were one 
of the proximate causes for the termination of the transaction. 
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rezoned, and despite the fact that discussions continued unabated 
for many months after Taylor's letter with little, if any, 
discussion concerning financing, and despite the fact that the 
discussions only turned sour after Anthony Middleton made his 
threats, that The Boyer Company walked from the sublease because 
of a perceived problem with financing without even attempting to 
present the project for financing to one single lender. The 
Middletons1 arguments strained credulity and they can hardly 
complain that the jury did not agree. 
The Middletons also assert in passing that their experts, 
Gary Banks and Gregory Bell, were of the opinion that the proposed 
project could not be financed by The Boyer Company without 
concessions from the Middletons. Again, the Middletons fail to 
marshal the evidence in this regard. As is set forth earlier in 
this brief (p. 24, fl 28), Medical Leasing's expert testified that 
in his opinion the project could be financed without any 
concessions. The jury obviously believed Medical Leasing1s expert. 
The evidence fully supported, if not compelled, the jury verdict. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED MEDICAL LEASING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Middletons contend that the trial court erred in 
awarding attorney's fees to Medical Leasing because the Middletons 
were not given a notice of default as supposedly required by 
paragraph 16 of the Amended Ground Lease, that attorney's fees 
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allegedly cannot be awarded for breach of the implied covenant of 
food faith and fair dealing, and because, so the argument goes, 
there was no finding that the Middletons breached the express terms 
of the Amended Ground Lease. These arguments should be rejected. 
1. Notice of Default Was Not Required in Order for Medical 
Leasing to be Entitled to Attorney's Fees and. In Any Event, Notice 
Was Given. 
Paragraph 16 of the Amended Ground Lease contained the 
following attorney's fees provision: 
If Landlord or Tenant default hereunder or file 
suit against the other which is any way connected with 
this Lease, the defaulting party shall pay to the 
prevailing party a reasonable sum for attorney's fees, 
which shall be deemed to have accrued on the 
commencement of such action and shall be enforceable 
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The Middletons' argument that in order to be entitled to 
attorney's fees under this provision Medical Leasing was required 
to give a written notice of default under paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Ground Lease cannot withstand analysis for at least three 
reasons. 
First, as demonstrated earlier (pp. 41-43), and as the 
trial court ruled, paragraph 6 only required that a notice of 
default be given before the non-defaulting party could incur 
certain expenses in the performance of the lease or before the 
Middletons could terminate the lease. Paragraph 6 expressly did 
not limit any other remedies which the parties had. 
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Second, as earlier set forth (p. 44) , notice of default was 
in fact given to the Middletons on December 8, 1989 when Medical 
Leasing's attorney, Mr. Parsons, sent to Richard P. Middleton on 
behalf of all the Middletons a copy of Parsons' previous November 
17, 1989 default letter. 
Third, Medical Leasing was entitled to recover attorney's 
fees under paragraph 16 whether or not the Middletons were 
technically in "default" under paragraph 6 because paragraph 16 
allows attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any lawsuit 
"which is any way connected with this Lease." Indeed, the 
Middletons made this very argument below. They asserted that a 
party is entitled to attorney's fees under the Amended Ground Lease 
in two situations, that is if (1) the other party defaults; or (2) 
if the party prevails in a lawsuit which is in any way connected 
with the Lease. [See Williams & Hunt's Objection to Medical 
Leasing's Application for Attorney's Fees, and Moyle & Draper's 
Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Attorney's 
Fees, R. 1261-1264, 1268-1269]. The Middletons were correct in 
that regard. 
2. The Middletons Did Breach the Express Terms of the 
Amended Ground Lease. 
The Middletons, in ostrich-like fashion, erroneously argue 
that Medical Leasing never identified any breach by the Middletons 
of the express terms of the Lease and that, in any event, the jury 
never found a breach of the express provisions of the Lease. 
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To the contrary, the Middletons1 wrongful threats of 
litigation made in order to derail the sublease with The Boyer 
Company constituted a breach of the express provisions of paragraph 
8 of the Amended Ground Lease under which they agreed that the 
Property could be developed by an independent third party without 
their consent unless subordination was sought. 
The claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing was also grounded upon the provisions of paragraph 
8. The Utah Court of Appeals made it clear in Ted R. Brown & 
Associates v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah App. 1988), 
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not something 
floating around unconnected to the contract between the parties. 
The covenant in fact arises from the contractual obligations the 
parties have voluntarily undertaken: 
In exercising its rights under this final 
modification of the parties1 contract. Came' s implied 
duty of good faith did not reguire it to keep 
extending the deadline ad infinitum until the Church 
contract was awarded. '[W]here the parties have made 
an express contract, the court should not find a 
different one by implication concerning the same 
subject matter if the evidence does not justify [such] 
an inference1 . . . In other words, such an inference 
or covenant relating to a specific contract right 
excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a 
different or contradictory nature. . . . 
It is fundamental that every contract imposes a 
duty on the parties to exercise their contractual 
rights and perform their contractual obligations 
reasonably and in good faith . . . Nonetheless, a 
court may not make a better contract for the parties 
than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a 
court may not enforce asserted rights not supported 
by the contract itself. . . . 
[753 P.2d at 970] [Emphasis added]. See also St. Benedict's Dev. 
v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
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Thus, the jury's finding of a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case could only 
have been premised on a finding that paragraph 8 of the Amended 
Ground Lease was expressly breached, [See Jury Instruction No. 24, 
R. 1541-1542]. Accordingly, the fact that special verdict question 
number 4 asked the jury whether the Middletons had breached the 
express terms of the Amended Ground Lease "and/or" the implied 
covenant of good faith is irrelevant. 
The Middletons place great emphasis on McKenzie v. Kaiser-
Aetna , 127 Cal.Rptr. 275 (Cal. App. 1976). McKenzie is not on 
point. In McKenzie, the attorney's fees provision in the contract 
only allowed attorney's fees "in any action brought to enforce the 
performance of this contract, or any of the terms, covenants or 
conditions thereof. . . . " The court thus observed that it was 
"necessary to determine whether all those causes of action were 
'action[s] on [the] contract.'" The court concluded that an action 
for negligent misrepresentation is not an action on contract and 
that because the jury could have awarded its verdict on the basis 
of the negligent misrepresentation theory, fees could not be 
awarded. 
In stark contrast, the attorney's fee provision in the 
present case allows fees in any suit which is "in any connected 
with this Lease." Both Medical Leasing's claims for express breach 
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing were actions on the contract and "connected with" the 
Amended Ground Lease. 
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3. Medical Leasing Was Entitled to Attorney's Fees For 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The Middletons rely on this Court's decision in Cluff v. 
Culmer, 556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), in support of their argument that 
attorney's fees cannot be awarded for breach of the covenant of 
good faith. The Middletons' reliance is misplaced. 
In Cluff, this Court upheld the trial court's refusal to 
allow attorney's fees, finding that an implied covenant arising 
from the landlord/tenant relationship (not the contract) that the 
tenant would not commit waste did not come within the scope of the 
attorney's fees provision because an action to recover damages for 
waste did not constitute an action to enforce the written contract. 
In other words, the implied covenant in Cluff did not arise from 
the language of the contract, but was grounded upon the existence 
of the landlord/tenant relationship. The three cases cited by the 
Cluff court, Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930), Leone v. 
Zuniga, 34 P.2d 699 (Utah 1934), and Jacobsen v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 
(Utah 1954), all involved contracts with a narrow attorney's fee 
provision that only allowed fees in suits to "enforce" the 
contract. In each case, the contract had already been forfeited 
and the court ruled the suit therefore was not to enforce the 
contract. 
In the case at bar, the breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by the Middletons was in fact based 
upon the language of the paragraph 8 of the Amended Ground Lease 
entitling Medical Leasing to sublease for development without 
68 
consent. The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing constituted a breach of the lease. Moreover, the 
attorney's fee provision in the present case, which allows 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an action in any way 
connected with the lease, is much broader than the provision in 
Clufff which only allowed fees incurred in the "enforcement of the 
contract." Courts have allowed attorney's fees for breach of 
implied contract or warranty in situations far less clearly within 
the language of the contract permitting fees. See, e.g., Cabal v. 
Donnelly, 714 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Or. App. 1986); Geraci v. Crown 
Chevrolet, Inc.. 444 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (Mass. App. 1983). 
4. The Award of Attorney's Fees Was Not Defective Because 
Medical Leasing Did Not Set Out the Time and Fees Expended for 
Unsuccessful Claims and Claims For Which There Would Be No 
Entitlement to Attorney's Fees. 
At trial, the parties stipulated to reserve the issue of 
attorney's fees until after the jury returned its verdict, at which 
time the parties would present their evidence of attorney's fees 
by way of affidavit. After the jury returned its verdict, Medical 
Leasing filed its affidavits concerning fees setting forth in 
substantial detail the services performed and the amount of fees 
incurred. Copies of the billings listing the services performed 
by date, the attorney performing the service and the time spent 
were attached. Medical Leasing asked for $319,502.00 attorney's 
fees and approximately $55,000.00 in other fees and costs (in 
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addition to taxable costs). The court cut this request by almost 
$100,000.00 and awarded $275,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees. 
The parties then entered into a stipulation by which the 
Middletons agreed to waive any claim or right to contest the 
court's determination that $275,000.00 was a reasonable attorney's 
fee. The Middletons, however, reserved their right to claim that 
Medical Leasing failed to allocate time and fees expended for 
successful claims for which there allegedly was not an entitlement 
to attorney's fees, unsuccessful claims for which there would not 
be an entitled to attorney's fees had the claims been successful, 
and claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney's fees. 
[R. 2950-2952]. 
The Middletons claim in this regard that Medical Leasing 
was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for its claims of 
interference with contract, interference with prospective economic 
relations or breach of the covenant of good faith and that all time 
associated with preparing the original complaint, which was later 
amended, and responding to a partially successful motion to dismiss 
must be disallowed. These contentions are without merit. 
Of course, the point of beginning for an award of 
attorney's fees is the attorney's fee provision contained in the 
contract. As this Court said in Travner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 
858 (Utah 1984) : 
[A] party is entitled only to those fees 
attributable to the successful vindication of 
contractual rights within the terms of their 
agreement. [Emphasis added]. 
The attorney's fee provision in the present case, as 
previously noted, is extremely broad. That provision allowed fees 
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to the prevailing party in any suit having any connection with the 
Lease. All of Medical Leasing's claims, under the alternative 
theories, arose out of the same wrongful acts and sought to 
vindicate Medical Leasingfs right under the Amended Ground Lease 
to sublease the Property for development. 
In this regard, the fact that early on in the case Medical 
Leasing!s separate claim for interference with contract was 
dismissed is irrelevant because Medical Leasing ultimately 
prevailed on its claims for breach of contract and interference 
with prospective economic relations, each of which theories were 
grounded upon the same wrongful conduct of the Middletons. Under 
the Middletons1 argument, if suit were brought for breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit alleging the failure 
of a defendant to pay amounts due under a contract and the 
plaintiff only obtained judgment for the full amount due on the 
breach of contract theory, the plaintiff would only be entitled to 
recover a portion of the fees incurred. Such a result would be 
incongruous. The important point in this case is that Medical 
Leasing recovered 100% of the damages it was seeking in the amount 
of $2,582,780.00 plus accrued interest for the wrongful conduct of 
the Middletons. Medical Leasing was entitled to recover all of the 
attorney's fees incurred in obtaining that judgment. 
The Middletons would have this court invalidate the 
attorney's fee award on the basis that it must be reduced by the 
time associated with responding to a motion to dismiss, as a result 
of which Medical Leasingfs claim for an injunction was dismissed. 
To the contrary, the claim for an injunction was simply part of the 
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claim upon which Medical Leasing ultimately prevailed — that is 
that the Middletons1 wrongful threats of litigation torpedoed the 
sublease with The Boyer Company. In any event, even if it were 
appropriate to reduce the fees by those incurred in connection with 
the injunction, the information provided to the court below was 
more than sufficient for the court to make that deduction. As 
demonstrated below, the amount of attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with the injunction could not have comprised more than 
approximately $2,500.00. [R. 2696-2698]. 
Lastly, the Middletons object that Medical Leasing's claims 
for fees included $25,000 for the cost of Medical Leasing's damage 
expert. The Middletons provide no support for the argument that 
this amount was included by the court in its award. Moreover, the 
Middletons ignore the fact that the court reduced Medical Leasing's 
claim for attorney's fees and for the expert fees and other costs 
from approximately $375,000.00 to $275,000.00, a reduction of 
approximately $100,000.00, which was far more than the amount 
claimed for the damage expert. Beyond that, the Middletons did not 
reserve the right in the stipulation entered into between the 
parties to claim that the attorney's fee award was improper for 
supposedly including this item. Presumably, the court deducted 
this amount in awarding the fees. In any event, the Middletons 
cannot now object to the award on that basis. 
In summary, the attorney's fee award by the trial court 
was reasonable, was fully supported by the evidence and the 
applicable law and should be upheld. 
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F. THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE MIDDLETONS WERE 
JOINTLY LIABLE FOR BREACH OF THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE. 
1. As the Landlord Under the Amended Ground Lease, the 
Middletons Were Jointly Liable for Its Breach. 
During trial Judge Rigtrup reserved the legal issue of 
whether all the Middletons were jointly liable for Anthony 
Middleton's breach of the Amended Ground Lease because they all 
signed the Amended Ground Lease as "Landlord." After extensive 
post-trial briefing and argument, Judge Rigtrup ruled that, in 
light of the jury's finding that the Amended Ground Lease was 
breached, all the Middletons were jointly liable because they had 
all undertaken the obligations as Landlord. 
The Middletons attempt to convince this Court that because 
as tenants in common they only owned an undivided fractional part 
of the Property and because one co-tenant as a general principle 
cannot bind another co-tenant's interest in property, that there 
is no joint liability in this case for breach of the Amended Ground 
Lease. This argument misses the point. The trial court did not 
hold the Middletons1 jointly liable because they were co-tenants, 
but because they had all executed the Amended Ground Lease as 
"Landlord" and had thus contractually undertaken joint obligations. 
The Middletons also argue that a lease of land by two or 
more tenants in common is regarded as several leases by the tenants 
of their undivided interest. The only authority which the 
Middletons can find for this proposition are three treatises 
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written in 1886, 1887 and 1906, respectively, when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was still the law of the land. Although these cases are 
undoubtedly of historical legal interest, they fly in the face of 
modern authorities. 
Under the modern view, leases are, of course, simply viewed 
as contracts that are governed by ordinary principles of contract 
law. See, e.g. , LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 805 P.2d 189, 193 
(Utah App. 1991); Powell, The Law of Real Property, § 230[2] at 
16B-7 (1991) (courts have adopted the view that leases should be 
construed like any other contract) . When two or more persons agree 
to undertake performance of an obligation pursuant to a contract, 
the law presumes that the undertaking of that performance was joint 
and holds the parties jointly responsible for the performance of 
the undertaking. Turner v. Gunderson, 807 P. 2d 370, 375 (Wash. 
App. 1991); Moore v. Seabaugh, 684 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Mo. App. 1984); 
Schneider v. Bvtner. 481 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (A.D.3 Dept. 1984); 
Morgan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 307 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. 1981). As 
is stated in Section 289(1) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts: 
[W]here two or more parties to a contract promise 
the same performance to the same promisee, each is 
bound to the whole performance thereof, whether his 
duty is joint, several, or joint and several. 
For any breach of contract, there is only one cause of 
action against the joint obligors who are jointly liable for the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. Turner v. Gunderson, 807 P. 2d 
at 375 (citing Harrison v. Peuga, 480 P.2d 247 (Wash. App. 1971)). 
The presumption of joint liability can only be overcome by 
showing from the language in the contract that the parties intended 
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their liability to be several. Donzella v. New York State 
Throuahwav Authority. 180 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1958); 
Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 518 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); Alexander v. Wheeler, 407 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (A.D. 4 Dept. 
1978); Don L. Tullis & Associates, Inc. v. Gover, 577 S.W.2d 891, 
900 (Mo. App. 1979); Anderson v. Barnes, 671 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. 
App. 1983). 
In the Amended Ground Lease in the present case, each of 
the Middletons signed personally and were denominated in the 
agreement in the singular as "Landlord" and there is no 
differentiation between them with respect to their rights and 
obligations. That designation makes clear that the agreement 
contemplated the Middletons would be treated as single obligor and 
therefore be jointly liable. Drawing that same conclusion from 
similar language, the court in Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc.. 
supra, noted: 
We have had occasion in the fairly recent past 
to point out that 'the general rule is that the 
obligation created by the promise of several persons 
is joint unless the contrary is made evident.' 
[Citations omitted]. The contract before us falls 
squarely within the ambit of that principle. 
Throughout the contract, Goodman Properties is 
referred to by the word "owner." Similarly, the 
Claymans and Hillman are invariably referred to 
collectively by the words "respective purchaser" or 
"purchaser" always in the singular. Nowhere does the 
contract distinguish the three in any way or separate 
the rights and obligations among them. On the 
contrary, the contract uniformly treats the three as 
a team, without so much as a whisper that thev are to 
be differentiated in any ways or for any purpose. 
[518 F.2d at 1032] [Emphasis added]. 
Similarly, in Huggins v. Bacon, 321 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. App. 
1984) , the court held that a real estate investor as a joint 
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obligor under a contract along with the contractor was liable for 
breach of an implied agreement to build a house in a fit and 
workmanlike manner. The court reasoned that even though the 
investor had not worked on the construction of the house, he was 
still jointly liable because he had signed the contract. 
The Middletons argue that, in fact, the language of the 
Amended Ground Lease using the term "Landlord" in the singular 
supports the conclusion they their liability is severable, relying 
upon F.D.I.C. v. Bismarck Inv. Corp., 547 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976). 
The Bismarck court, in clearly identified dicta, stated that, 
"[o]rdinarily, a promise by two or more in the singular number is 
prima facie several while a promise in the plural is prima facie 
joint." [547 P.2d at 214]. Justice Ellett gave no explanation for 
this statement. Although Justice Ellettfs language is 
incomprehensible, the case cited by the court in support of that 
statement contains a correct statement of the law and clarifies 
what the Bismarck court meant. Bismarck cited Lovell v. 
Commonwealth Thread Co. , 172 N.E. 76 (1930), which involved two 
separate promissors promising clearly different performances. The 
court held each promissor only to their respective promises. As 
to joint obligations generally, however, the Lovell court was in 
accord with the cases cited by Medical Leasing on this point: 
Where two or more persons covenant with another 
by the words "we covenant" the words indicate a joint 
covenant, and are to be so considered, unless from the 
whole contract it should appear that such was not the 
understanding of the parties. If two covenant 
generally for themselves, without any words of 
severance, or that they, or any one of them, shall do 
such a thing, a joint charge is created. 
[172 N.E. at 78] . 
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The Middletons assert that the court must look to the 
underlying circumstances of the parties in interpreting the 
contract. Of course, in interpreting a contract, the court just 
looks at the four corners of the contract unless it is ambiguous. 
J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988). The 
language of the Amended Ground Lease is not ambiguous in this 
regard. But, even if the court were to look at the circumstances 
at the time of execution of the Amended Ground Lease, those 
circumstances point to joint liability. All of the Middletons 
owned undivided fractional interests in the Property. None of the 
Middletons could separately lease their fractional interest in the 
Property. All of the Middletons had to join together to do so. 
Lithia Lumber Co. v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647 (Or. 1968), cited 
by the Middletons, provides no support for their position. In 
Lithia, the court found that different defendants who signed 
completely separate contracts which expired at different times and 
dealt with separate subjects were not jointly and severally liable. 
Although the defendants had all signed a third contract to sell 
timber to the plaintiff, because the defendants independently owned 
different parcels of timber, the court found their liabilities were 
several. In the case at bar, of course, the Middletons did not own 
separate parcels of property; they each owned an undivided 
fractional part of the whole parcel and no one Middleton could have 
separately leased the Property. 
The Middletons next say that the Amended Ground Lease was 
ambiguous as to whether the parties intended the Middletons1 
promises to be joint or several, necessitating consideration of 
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extrinsic evidence. The Middletons do not even bother to explain 
to the court the nature of the ambiguity they contend exists. The 
language of the Amended Ground Lease is, in fact, clear; the legal 
result of that language is that the Middletons are jointly liable. 
Moreover, the only extrinsic evidence to which the 
Middletons point to support their position is that the Middletons 
had separate counsel in the Zions Litigation and that before the 
September 26, 1989 meeting Dr. Wong made an effort to inform 
Richard G. Middleton of the meeting, to which Mr. Middleton replied 
that he knew of the discussions but that Anthony Middleton only 
represented one-third of the family. The fact that the Middletons 
had been represented by different counsel in litigation is, of 
course, unremarkable and largely irrelevant. Parties jointly bound 
on contracts are commonly represented by separate counsel because, 
even though they are jointly bound on the contract, the obligors 
may have claims for indemnity against each other or have other 
conflicting interests. The fact that Dr. Wong was told on one 
occasion respecting a single meeting in 1989 that Anthony Middleton 
did not speak for all of the Middletons was relevant to the issue 
of agency, but it has nothing to do with the legal obligation of 
the Middletons as "Landlord" under the Amended Ground Lease which 
they had executed years before, nor to their intent at the time 
they signed the lease. 
However, the extrinsic evidence, even if considered, 
supports joint liability. Anthony Middleton was the only Middleton 
who took part in the communications and meetings which are the 
subject of this action concerning The Boyer Company sublease. 
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Anthony Middleton testified that he kept the family informed of 
what he was doing, including specifically informing George and 
Richard G. of the position that he was taking that the Middleton 
family was entitled to compensation. At no time did any of the 
Middletons disavow Anthony Middletonfs conduct even after December 
8, 1989 when Mr. Parsons sent to Richard G. Middleton a copy of the 
November 17, 1989 letter demanding that the Middletons withdraw 
their threats of litigation.14 Finally, each month a single rent 
payment was faithfully made by Medical Leasing and sent to Richard 
P. Middleton who distributed the payment among all the Middletons. 
There are compelling policy reasons for the universal rule 
holding obligors under a contract — including this contract — 
jointly liable. A rule which allows one joint obligor to destroy 
the obligee's benefits under a contract, but at the same time 
requires the obligee's full performance to the other joint obligors 
would set commercial transactions, large and small, on their heads. 
For example, if the Middletons' position is correct, then one 
Middleton could prevent Medical Leasing from using the Property, 
but the other Middletons could still demand payment of their share 
of the rent. That is exactly the type of absurd result which the 
joint obligor rule avoids. Add to that the Middletons1 notion that 
the burden is on the obligee to discover which of the joint 
obligors breached and that the obligee's remedy is limited only to 
that person, and contract law would be turned on its head. 
The Middletons in fact argue that: "Even Anthony's actions were consistent with the parties' 
expectations." [Movie & Draper Brief, p. 25]. The malicious threats were not remotely consistent with Medical 
Leasing's expectations, but if they were consistent with the Middletons', the Middletons have little reason to 
be upset when the activity they "expected" resulted in their jointly liability. 
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Clearly, the rule recognizes that one must choose his other joint 
obligors carefully and that if one obligor breaches the contract, 
then the other joint obligors, who are in the best position to 
prevent or cure the breach, are the ones who bear the risk of the 
breach, rather than placing the risk of the breach on the obligee. 
The other obligors are therefore given a strong incentive to see 
that all of the obligors comply with their obligations and to take 
appropriate remedial action if those obligations are not being 
honored. For example, in the present case, this whole litigation 
could have been avoided if the other Middletons would simply have 
rejected Anthony Middleton's conduct and announced that the 
Middletons would honor their contractual obligations. 
2. Whether Or Not All of the Middletons Would Have Had to 
Join in Litigation on the Amended Ground Lease is Irrelevant. 
The Middletons attempt to convince the court that they 
could not possibly be jointly liable for Anthony Middleton's 
wrongful threats of litigation because, so the Middletons argue, 
all of them would have had to join together in a lawsuit against 
Medical Leasing on the lease to make good on the threat. This 
argument is simply wrong. 
In the first place, the Middletons miscite R. Powell and 
P. Rohan, Law of Real Property, § 606[1] (1991), for the 
proposition that any action on the lease would have to be joined 
in by all of the Middletons. Powell only states that in actions 
against lessees to recover rent, the joinder of all co-tenants is 
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usually required. A lawsuit by Anthony Middleton to prevent 
development of the Property would not have been one to recover 
rent. 
More importantly, whether or not all of the Middletons 
would have had to join in a lawsuit against Medical Leasing with 
respect to Medical Leasing's right to sublease the Property to The 
Boyer Company for development is beside the point. The wrong 
complained of in this lawsuit was not the filing of groundless 
litigation, but the threat to do so. Those threats were made by 
the Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease and the Landlord is 
liable for the threats. And, none of the Middletons ever disavowed 
the threats. 
3. Medical Leasing Pled Joint Liability. 
Finally, the Middletons contend that Judge Rigtrup erred 
in finding all of them jointly liable as the Landlord under the 
Amended Ground Lease because Medical Leasing supposedly failed to 
plead joint liability on any theory other than agency. This 
contention was properly rejected by the trial court. 
The Amended Complaint unquestionably alleged that all of 
the Middletons breached the Amended Ground Lease and were liable 
for that breach. Paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint stated that 
the, "action arises out of Defendants1 course of conduct which 
constitutes a breach of contract . . ." [R. 319]. In paragraph 4, 
Medical Leasing alleged that, ". . . the Defendants are the 
'Landlord1 and Medical Leasing is the 'Tenant1 under the 1980 
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Amended Ground Lease." Paragraph 14 recited that, the "Defendants 
are collectively referred to in this Complaint as 'Defendants1, the 
'Middletons1 or the 'Landlord1 under the 1980 Amended Ground 
Lease." Paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint alleged that all of 
the Middletons breached the Amended Ground Lease by seeking to 
preclude Medical Leasing from subleasing by improper threats of 
litigation. Medical Leasing went on to seek recovery of damages 
for breach of the Amended Ground Lease from all of the Middletons. 
After thoroughly reviewing the allegations of the Amended 
Complaint, Judge Rigtrup concluded that the pleading was, in fact, 
sufficient notice of Medical Leasing1s claim that the Middletons 
were jointly liable. [R. 5958-5960]. 
The Middletons1 position apparently is that Medical Leasing 
was obligated to expressly allege in the Amended Complaint the 
legal theory that because each of the Middletons executed the 
Amended Ground Lease as the "Landlord" that they were jointly 
liable. To the contrary, Medical Leasing was only required under 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to allege a short and 
plain statement of the facts upon which its claim was based. 
Medical Leasing undisputedly did so. Medical Leasing had no 
obligation to plead the legal conclusion that all of the Middletons 
were liable because they signed the Amended Ground Lease. In fact, 
pleading legal conclusions or arguments, although not fatal, is 
actually considered a pleading defect. See, e.g., Bond v. Dunmire, 
473 N.E.2d 78 (111. App. 1984) (allegations of legal conclusions 
constitute merely formal defects in complaint, not defects of 
substance); Aster v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y. 
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1961) (legal conclusions are improper in pleading and party should 
not be required to answer them); Reinert v. Carver, 41 So.2d 449 
(Fla. 1949). 
The Middletons miscite New Jersey Office Supply, Inc. v. 
Feldman. 1990 LW 74477 (U.S.D.C.N.J. 1990), and Sharkey v. Lathram, 
156 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio 1959), for the proposition that joint 
liability should be separately pleaded. These cases only stand for 
the proposition that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to 
show joint liability, a standard clearly met by Medical Leasing in 
the case at bar. 
The Middletons1 claim of surprise strains credulity. The 
essential facts underlying the joint obligation of the Middletons 
as Landlord under the Amended Ground Lease were clearly alleged. 
The Middletons had sufficient notice to allow them to prepare their 
defense. It was their responsibility to conduct appropriate legal 
research and discovery to meet the legal issues raised by the facts 
alleged in the pleadings. The Middletons cannot blame the trial 
court or Medical Leasing if they failed to do so.ls 
G. THE JURY'S AWARD OF LOST PROFITS TO BE SUFFERED BY 
MEDICAL LEASING DURING THE REMAINING TERM OF THE AMENDED GROUND 
LEASE WAS ENTIRELY PROPER. 
The jury awarded Medical Leasing compensatory damages in 
In this regard, although the Middletons point to jury instruction number 14 concerning the claims of 
the parties as supposedly showing that the joint liability issue was never raised and that only agency had been 
raised as a ground for joint liability, the instruction shows just the contrary: 
"Medical Leasing claims that all actions of Anthony Middleton referred to in the 
previous paragraph are attributed to each and every other Defendant by the rules of the 
law, including the rules of agency." 
83 
the sum of $2,582,780.00, representing the profits Medical Leasing 
lost as a proximate result of the destruction of the proposed 
sublease with The Boyer Company. This amount was the present value 
of the rent which The Boyer Company would have paid Medical Leasing 
under the proposed sublease. 
The Middletons now argue that the juryfs award of damages 
to Medical Leasing for loss of profits during the remaining term 
of the Amended Ground Lease was improper because Medical Leasing 
supposedly failed to mitigate its damages, because the case of Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), allegedly 
prohibits a jury from awarding future lost profits and because 
there was not sufficient evidence of the amount of lost profits. 
These arguments are without support in the evidence or under the 
applicable law. 
1. The Middletons Failed to Meet Their Burden of Proving 
that Medical Leasing Did Not Take Reasonable Action to Mitigate its 
Damages. 
The Middletons pled mitigation as an affirmative defense 
in this action. The Middletons, of course, had the burden of 
proving by competent evidence that Medical Leasing could have 
mitigated its damages by reasonable effort and expense. Pratt v. 
Board of Education. 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977); John Call 
Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990); A. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts. § 1039 (1964). This burden required 
the Middletons to prove what Medical Leasing could have done to 
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mitigate its damages and how much of the losses could have been 
avoided through such efforts. 
The Middletons did not even attempt at trial to meet their 
burden of proving a failure to mitigate. One searches the record 
in vain for any mention by the Middletons of the mitigation issue 
or any attempt to present evidence thereon. The Middletons put on 
not one word of testimony concerning what Medical Leasing could 
have done with the Property or how much loss could have been 
avoided.16 In fact, the Middletons vehemently argued at trial that 
Medical Leasing was not damaged by the threats of litigation 
because the Property could not be commercially developed without 
the Middletons granting concessions they were not obligated to 
grant under the Amended Ground Lease. In other words, Medical 
Leasing could not possibly have done anything to mitigate. The 
Middletons1 belated cry of failure to mitigate is inherently 
inconsistent with the position they took at trial. 
Not only did the Middletons entirely fail to carry their 
burden on the mitigation issue, the expert testimony on damages 
from both sides demonstrated that Medical Leasing could have 
done nothing to mitigate its damages. Medical Leasing's 
financing expert, Henry Schwendiman, testified that because of 
the state of the commercial lending industry and the economy 
Dr. Ring testified that prior to trial Medical Leasing had not attempted to sublease the property to 
anyone else because it could not do so in good faith without disclosing Anthony Middleton's threats of 
litigation. CR. 5046-5047]. Medical Leasing was not required to cave in to Anthony Middleton's coercive 
demands and threats of litigation in order to mitigate damages. Hector. Inc. v. United Savings & Loan 
Association, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). Further, the evidence was undisputed that the threats had been issued 
by Anthony Middleton, and had never been withdrawn. In fact, Anthony Middleton testified that his position at 
trial was the same as when he talked to Boyer, Medical Leasing and his diary in the events leading up to the 
suit. 
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relating to commercial office space there was only a remote 
chance that a developer could obtain financing for development 
within the ten years following trial. [R. 5100-5101, 5124-5127, 
5136-5145]. Mr. Schwendiman testified that at the end of ten 
years, even if a developer were then still interested in the 
Property, the remaining term of the Amended Ground Lease would 
be of an insufficient length of time to amortize that 
developer's loan so the developer could realize an adequate 
return on his original investment. Mr. Schwendiman testified 
that as the amortization of a loan is shortened, the monthly 
payment stays the same, but the loan amount gets smaller. Thus, 
the developer is required to invest more of his own money and 
borrow less. The rents and net income stay the same and the 
developer gets a smaller return on his investment. [R. 512 3-
5145]. 
Medical Leasing presented the jury with three 
alternatives for calculating damages. [Plaintiff's Exhibit 47; 
R. 5210-5218]. One alternative assumed Medical Leasing would be 
able to secure a sublease within five years, a second 
alternative assumed ten years. However, because the jury 
believed Medical Leasing's evidence that the lack of feasibility 
of financing any kind of development after the withdrawal of The 
Boyer Company precluded mitigation through a future sublease, it 
awarded damages according to the third alternative which was 
that Medical Leasing would be unable to sublease the Property 
for the remainder of the Amended Ground Lease term. 
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Not only did the Middletons not contravene Mr, 
Schwendiman's testimony on this point, but their own experts1 
testimony supported that conclusion. The Middletons1 experts 
testified that Plaintiff could not sublease the Property for 
development back in 1989-1990, at the time of trial or in the 
future. The jury rejected the conclusion about 1989-1990, 
accepting Anthony Middleton's appraisal of Boyer as a world-
class developer and concluding with Boyer that The Boyer Company 
could have done the project. As to "now" or the "future,11 the 
experts on both sides all agreed the chances were slim to none. 
[R. 5399-5404, 5348-5359]. The transaction with The Boyer 
Company was a one-time opportunity that the Middletons 
destroyed. They must pay for the entire loss caused by their 
actions. 
The court properly instructed the jury on mitigation 
[Jury Instruction No. 30, R. 1548] and, in awarding Medical 
Leasing prospective damages, the jury obviously believed Medical 
Leasingfs evidence that it could not mitigate its damages 
because the Middletons1 breach left Medical Leasing with 
undeveloped Property that could not produce rent for Medical 
Leasing in the future. The Middletons did nothing to meet even 
their burden of production with respect to mitigation. There 
simply is no basis for disturbing they jury's determination. 
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2. The Reid Case is Not Applicable to the Case at Bar. 
The Middletons misread and misapply the case of Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), in 
attempting to avoid the jury's award of future lost profits by 
arguing that damages could only be awarded through the date of 
trial. The holding in Reid is confined to a narrow factual 
circumstance not present in the case at bar. 
In Reid, a tenant defaulted in payment of rent and 
abandoned the premises. The landlord sought to recover rental 
due through the entire remaining term of the lease. Although 
this Court recognized that a commercial lease is a contract 
governed by principles of contract law and that the "concept of 
mitigation of damages is grounded in traditional contract law 
principles . . . " [776 P.2d at 904 n.8], the court carved out 
a narrow exception to the general rule on mitigation by imposing 
upon a landlord suing a tenant for unpaid rent a continuing duty 
to mitigate damages by making reasonable efforts to relet the 
premises throughout the remainder of the lease term. Thus, the 
court held that in a suit by a landlord against a tenant for 
unpaid rent, the landlord is only entitled to recover rent due 
through the date of trial and must thereafter collect future 
rent in supplemental proceedings. 
Reid did not purport to change the general rule that the 
breaching party must plead and prove mitigation as an 
affirmative defense or that damages for future lost profits can 
properly be awarded. Insofar as Medical Leasing has been able 
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to ascertain, there is not one case in all of American 
jurisprudence which has applied the rule of the Reid case to 
anything but a suit by a landlord for unpaid rents. 
Of course, the case at bar does not involve a claim by 
a landlord cigainst a tenant for unpaid rents. Rather, this is 
a suit by the tenant against the landlord for breach of the 
express provisions of the lease, the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing implied in the lease, and for the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations, 
causing Medical Leasing a substantial loss of future profits 
that could have been realized through a sublease with The Boyer 
Company. The fact that Medical Leasing's lost profits claim is 
measured by the rent it would have received from The Boyer 
Company over the remaining term of the lease does not somehow 
transform this into a suit by a landlord against a tenant for 
unpaid rents. 
Utah courts, consistent with the courts throughout the 
nation, embrace the principle that leases are contracts which 
are governed by ordinary contract principles. See, e.g., LMV 
Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin. 805 P.2d 189, 193 (Utah App. 1991); see 
also Powell, Law of Real Property, § 230[2] at 16B-7 (1991). It 
is, of course, a well established principle of contract law that 
a party is entitled to recover all foreseeable damages 
proximately caused by a defendant's breach, including damages 
for losses reasonably certain to occur in the future, and is not 
limited to damages occurring to the date of trial. 
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This Court's decision in Penelko. Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc.r 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982), is directly on 
point. In Penelko. the landlord constructed a 3 5-foot driveway 
between the tenant's theater and an adjacent restaurant which 
had the effect of eliminating approximately fifty parking spaces 
which had been available for the tenant's customers. The tenant 
sued the landlord for breach of the lease and for tortious 
interference with the tenant's business. The jury entered a 
verdict in favor of the tenant and against the landlord in the 
amount of $65,000.00, representing the amount of future lost 
profits resulting from the landlord's wrongful conduct. 
The landlord contended that it was improper for the 
trial court to have allowed the jury to speculate as to future 
lost profit. The Penelko court rejected this argument and held 
that the lost profits had been properly awarded, observing: 
The crucial question in awarding future damages 
involving a breach of the lease which affects the 
long-term value of the lease or the lessee's profit 
making potential is whether such damages can be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty. [Citations 
omitted] The record shows that plaintiff's expert 
accountant prepared exhibits and testified as to the 
profits which could have reasonably been anticipated 
for future operations based on the plaintiff's past 
operations. . . . The jury found on the basis of 
evidence presented at trial that Price was guilty of 
certain continuing lease violations. This fact 
distinguishes this case from Guntert v. City of 
Stockton . . . cited by Price, wherein it was held 
that where there is only a partial breach of contract 
the injured party may recover damages only to the time 
of trial and may not recover future damages. 
[642 P.2d at 1235]. 
As recognized in Penelko, any notion of an ongoing duty to 
mitigate contract damages after trial is entirely at odds with the 
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well-settled principle that a total breach of a contract gives rise 
to one action that must resolve all of the plaintifffs claims for 
present and prospective damages and all of the defendant's 
mitigation defense. Thus, in Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of 
America, 442 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1968), the court stated: 
[A]n entire claim arising either upon a contract 
or from a wrong cannot be divided and made the subject 
of several suits. In such a case it is no warrant for 
a second action that the party may not be able to 
actually prove in the first action all the items of 
the demand, or that all damages may not then have been 
actually suffered. He is bound to prove in the first 
action, not only such damage as has been actually 
suffered, but also such prospective damage by reason 
of the breach as he may be legally entitled to, for 
the judgment he recovers in such action will be a 
conclusive adjudication as to the total damage on 
account of the breach. 
[Id. at 382]. 
The obligation of a tenant to mitigate prospective economic 
loss in the face of interference by the landlord with the business 
contemplated by the tenant's lease is entirely inconsistent with 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. 
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). In Leigh Furniture, the Supreme 
Court specifically held that the jury could determine the tenant's 
prospective loss of business based on evidence at the time of trial 
of the landlord's interference with the tenant's business. In that 
case, the Supreme Court permitted the jury to assess prospective 
economic loss with respect to unidentified customers on the basis 
of projections concerning the effect of the landlord's interference 
on such unidentified persons. 
In this case, the customer and the business prospects were 
concrete and specific and the effect on the subject transaction, 
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as demonstrated to the jury, and the amount of damages accruing 
from the interference could be specifically and mathematically 
calculated. That specific mathematical calculation made by Medical 
Leasing1s accounting expert, Merrill Norman, was embraced by the 
jury on the grounds that the lease opportunity had been destroyed 
and would not in all probability reappear during a period of time 
that the lease term would sustain a viable business enterprise. 
The Middletons elected not to counter that evidence, but to rely 
solely upon their strategic decision to resist liability and avoid 
the issue of prospective damage. 
Numerous other authorities recognize the right of a tenant 
to recover future damages from a breaching landlord. See, e.g. , 
Noble v. Tweedy, 203 P.2d 778 (Cal. App. 1949); Sagebrush 
Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d 198, 204 (Wyo. 1979); 
Restatement (Second) of Property, §§ 7.1 and 10.2 (1977). 
Even if, contrary to what is argued above, Reid could be 
applied to something other than an action by a landlord for rent, 
it would be inapplicable to the present case. 
First, Reid and the cases it followed, respecting the same 
narrow context, all involved situations where the tenant had 
abandoned the property. The landlord was then left with the 
property and no hindrance to reletting it immediately. In this 
case, of course, Anthony Middleton actively sought to prevent 
Medical Leasing from developing the Property and was successful in 
doing so. In point of fact, Tony Middleton repeated and reasserted 
this "philosophical position" that his family had the right to 
92 
interfere and his prediction they would do so. Those threats have 
never been withdrawn. The Property could not be relet. 
It is a well-settled principle of law that "losses are not 
regarded as avoidable if the defendant himself prevents the 
plaintiff from taking the steps necessary to avoid them," and the 
interfering party is precluded from asserting mitigation as an 
affirmative defense. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 773 P. 2d 666, 674 
(Kan. App. 1989) ; A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 1039 at 250-51 
(1964). Similarly, when both parties to a contract are in equal 
positions to mitigate damages caused by one party's breach, the 
breaching party may not assert mitigation as an affirmative 
defense. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982); 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777-78 
(Utah 1983). 
Second, and even more importantly, Reid is not applicable 
because, as previously demonstrated, the undisputed evidence, 
including the evidence put forth by the Middletons, proved that 
Medical Leasing could not sublease the Property for development in 
the future. 
3. The Jury Verdict Does Not Allow Medical Leasing a 
Double Recovery. 
The Middletons repeat their argument in the court below 
that allowing Medical Leasing to recover damages for the remaining 
term of the Amended Ground Lease may result in a double recovery 
because Medical Leasing has the potential opportunity to sublease 
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the Property in the future. This argument ignores the evidence at 
trial and the jury's determination. 
The undisputed evidence at the trial was that 1989 was 
right at the peak of a boom period for commercial real estate when 
financing was relatively easy to obtain [R. 5119-5122]. Mr. 
Schwendiman testified that the financing market started tightening 
by the spring if 1990 and became enormously restrictive by the 
winter of 1991 because of the savings and loan crisis and pressure 
from rating agencies and regulators on insurance companies to 
reduce the amount of their portfolios invested in mortgages. [Id. ] 
Mr. Schwendiman testified that although financing developments on 
unsubordinated ground leases was very feasible during the time The 
Boyer Company was intending to develop the Property, thereafter 
such financing would be rejected for more conventional 
arrangements, especially in light of the substantially shrinking 
field of lenders. [R. 5100-5101, 5119-5122]. As previously 
stated, Mr. Schwendiman further opined that it would be five to 
seven years before financing was even remotely feasible and ten 
years before it would be likely that financing could be obtained 
for the development proposed by Boyer, at which time the project 
would no longer be feasible. Such a diminution of the remaining 
term of the Amended Ground Lease, even if a developer were still 
interested in the Property at that time, would leave an 
insufficient length of time to amortize that developer's loan so 
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the developer could realize an adequate return on his original 
investment.17 [ R. 5145]. 
Although the Middletons now scream "double recovery," the 
Middletons presented not one word of testimony, in any way, to 
contradict that of Mr. Schwendiman concerning future development 
of the Property and there is no evidence in the record that the 
Property can be developed on a sublease during the remaining term 
of the Amended Ground Lease. 
In fact, as already demonstrated, the Middletons, in an 
unsuccessful effort to try to prove that The Boyer Company would 
not have b€>en able to finance the proposed development, called 
experts to testify that in view of the provisions of the Amended 
Ground Lease between Medical Leasing and the Middletons, Medical 
Leasing would never be able to sublease the Property because any 
prospective sublessee would not be able to obtain financing. 
Accordingly, although the jury rejected the argument that The Boyer 
Company could not finance the project at the time the threats were 
made, the evidence offered by the Middletons corroborated Medical 
Leasing's damage evidence as it applied to future periods. The 
Middletons1 new unsupported contention that Medical Leasing may be 
able to make some productive use of the Property during the 
remaining term of the lease is pure speculation, is outside the 
record of this case and contrary to their own evidence.18 
Consistent with the testimony of all experts at trial, no development would occur without complete and 
permanent withdrawal of any threats by the Landlord of the groundless litigation, something that was never 
accomplished, even at trial. 
18 
The closest the Middletons can come in their briefs to showing the Property can be developed is to throw 
out the obviously improper observation, de hors the record, that one of their attorneys supposedly saw a 
Christmas tree lot operating on the Property in December, 1992, after this appeal was filed. 
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Whether the Property can be developed during the remaining 
term of the ground lease was a determination the jury was required 
to make based upon the evidence. The issue is no different in 
principle from any other suit for future lost profits. In any such 
case, a jury is required to make a reasoned judgment in a 
necessarily uncertain area based upon reasonable estimates, 
opinions and projections. Medical Leasing presented the jury with 
three possible alternatives with respect to future development of 
the Property. The jury obviously believed the competent evidence 
that Medical Leasing would be unable to develop the Property under 
the sublease for the remainder of the lease term. There simply is 
no basis for overturning that decision. 
The Middletons either had no rebuttal evidence on future 
development or made a calculated decision at trial not to attempt 
to challenge Medical Leasing1s evidence that future development of 
the Property was not feasible.19 Having lost the case, the 
Middletons are simply scrambling to attempt to avoid the 
consequences of their decision or inability to put on any evidence 
on this issue. There is no evidence to support the Middletons1 new 
position and it should be rejected. 
In this regard, to eliminate any possibility of double 
recovery, Judge Rigtrup included in the judgment a provision which 
allows the Middletons to seek out future development for the 
Property and to ask the court for credit against the judgment for 
a share of profits, if any are even realized, from any such 
If the Middletons had introduced evidence that Medical Leasing could sublease the Property for 
development in the future, it would have run counter to their evidence that no one, not even The Boyer Company, 
could have financed the proposed project, at a time when financing was relatively easy. 
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development. Although Medical Leasing does not believe that Judge 
Rigtrup technically had the authority to include this provision in 
the judgment, Medical Leasing did not resist it nor has Medical 
Leasing appealed with respect thereto. 
4. Medical Leasingfs Damage Theory Was Fully Supported 
By the Evidence. 
Finally, the Middletons contend that Medical Leasing*s 
damage theory is fatally flawed because it was based upon the 
assumption that Medical Leasing would have received from Boyer 
the monthly rents provided in the first draft of the sublease 
Medical Leasing prepared and delivered to Boyer on February 3, 
1989. The argument is that there was no basis for such an 
assumption because Boyer supposedly testified that after the 
Development Agreement expired on January 31, 1989 the parties 
talked about different terms for the agreement. Once again, 
this argument is not faithful to the record. 
The Development Agreement, executed by The Boyer Company 
and Medical Leasing on June 14, 1988, expressly set forth the 
rental which Boyer would pay for the Property. There was no 
evidence below that after the Development Agreement expired and 
the parties continued their discussions towards execution of a 
sublease that the parties ever discussed lowering that rent or 
that Boyer ever objected to the amount of rent set forth in the 
draft of the sublease. The drafts of the sublease carried the 
same rental rate and that aspect was never a topic of discussion 
97 
or controversy. Although Boyer testified that at some 
unspecified time after February, 1989 the parties talked about 
"some scenarios that would have allowed the rent to change," [R. 
4852] Boyer did not come close to testifying that there was any 
discussion prior to the litigation threats concerning changing 
the amount of rent.20 Dr. Wong testified no one ever suggested 
to Medical Leasing the business terms of the transaction had to 
change. [R. 4885-4886]. In fact, Greg Gardner, the project 
manager for The Boyer Company, testified there was no discussion 
concerning changing the rent: 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the only change that was 
talked about with respect to the rental provisions 
during the year, 1989, was the possible six-months1 
slippage in the lease dates? In other words, a six-
month slippage from when The Boyer Company would have 
to start paying rent to Medical Leasing? 
Mr. Frankenburg: Objection, he's leading. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Gurmankin: Let me ask it this way: Do you recall 
any demands proposed by The Boyer Company with respect 
to the rent other than some talk of slipping the lease 
dates back six months? 
A. No. 
[R. 4829]. 
In Penelko. Inc. v. John Price Associates, Inc., supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that a party is entitled to recover 
damages for lost profits if the jury is provided with a sufficient 
basis for estimating damages with reasonable certainty. In this 
20 
It is interesting to note in this regard that not even Taylor expressed any concerns about the amount 
of rent in his March 14, 1989 letter. 
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regard, the court noted that although a jury is not allowed to 
speculate freely as to the amount of damages or lost profits: 
The evidence, however, will be deemed sufficient 
to establish a basis for an award of damages for lost 
profits where the plaintiff has provided the best 
evidence available to him under the circumstances. 
[642 P.2d at 1233]. See also Gould v. Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co.. 309 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Utah 1957); GHK Associates 
v. Mayer Group, Inc., 274 Cal.Rptr. 168, 179 (Cal. App. 1990); 
Flagg v. Andrew Williams Stores, 273 P.2d 294 (Cal. App. 1954). 
Medical Leasing provided the best evidence available 
concerning the amount of damages it suffered; that evidence was 
fully sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
H. THE JURY VERDICT THAT ANTHONY MIDDLETON TQRTIOUSLY 
INTERFERED WITH MEDICAL LEASINGfS PROSPECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WAS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The jury determined that Anthony Middleton willfully and 
maliciously interfered with Medical Leasing1s prospective business 
relationship with The Boyer Company, with the dominant purpose to 
harm and/or immediately injure Medical Leasing, and awarded Medical 
Leasing compensatory and punitive damages. Anthony Middleton now 
claims that there is not sufficient evidence to support that 
finding and that he was privileged to interfere with the 
relationship. One more time, the Middletons fail to marshal the 
evidence supporting the juryfs verdict. 
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1- Improper Purpose and Improper Means. 
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
(Utah 1982), this court set forth the elements which a plaintiff 
must prove in order to recover for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, that is that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or potential 
economic relations for an improper purpose or by improper means 
causing injury to the plaintiff. See also St. Benedict's Dev. v. 
St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 197 (Utah 1991). It is 
respectfully submitted that in the present case, both of the 
alternative improper purpose or improper means requirements were 
met. 
First, the requirement that a defendant act with an 
improper purpose is satisfied by showing that a defendant's 
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff. Leigh Furniture, 
657 P. 2d at 307. Although it is true, as Anthony Middleton argues, 
that there is evidence that one of his purposes was to obtain 
economic gain, that is not sufficient to constitute a defense to 
a claim of improper purpose under Leigh Furniture. In the first 
place, there is substantial evidence that while Anthony Middleton's 
interest was to obtain additional consideration, whether or not he 
got it, his first and primary goal was to make sure "those birds", 
as he referred to Medical Leasing in his diary, did not obtain a 
"handsome income" from the Property. In that regard, he issued the 
threats of litigation knowing (as Boyer had told him) that such 
threats would drive The Boyer Company off the project. Clearly, 
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he understood his actions had the substantial prospect of 
destroying The Boyer Company deal for all parties. It is also 
important to note that he acknowledged to Boyer the narrow window 
of opportunity for the development, which was closing, and that 
litigation would cause it to be lost. [R. 5628]. Anthony 
Middleton attentively monitored the death of Medical Leasingfs 
transaction with The Boyer Company and, nevertheless persisted in 
his groundless threats. Even after he knew the Medical Leasing 
deal was destroyed, Anthony Middleton nevertheless refused to 
withdraw those threats. Thus, even though he knew he wasn't going 
to obtain any benefit, he acted to insure that Medical Leasing 
would not either. That evidence was consistent with the jury's 
finding that his dominant purpose was to injure Medical Leasing in 
accordance with the instruction regarding "improper purpose" [Jury 
Instruction No. 18, R. 1535] given by the court. 
Furthermore, the clear evidence was that Anthony Middleton 
acted intentionally to interfere with Medical Leasingfs contract 
in order to obtain an economic advantage to which he knew he was 
not entitled. In his diary note of August 6, 1989, Anthony 
Middleton recognized that the Middletons were not entitled to any 
compensation and that their consent was not necessary unless 
subordination was sought. When Anthony Middleton later made his 
litigation threats, he didnft even attempt to rely on any provision 
of the contract; he simply stated it was his "philosophical" belief 
that the Middletons were entitled to more money and that was 
enough. Anthony Middletonfs threats which were intended to block 
development of the Property unless his demands were met constituted 
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nothing less than extortion. Whether or not an extortionist has 
monetary gain as a predominant goal, that certainly cannot be said 
to be a "proper purpose." 
But whether or not the improper purpose prong of the Leigh 
Furniture test was met, the alternative improper means requirement 
was clearly satisfied. The improper means requirement is met by 
a showing of such things as threats, intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, unfounded litigation, or violations of "an 
established standard of a trade or profession." Leigh Furniture, 
657 P.2d at 308; St. Benedictf s Dev. , 811 P.2d at 198. For 
example, in Leigh Furniture, this court found that the defendant's 
actions in forcing defendant to defend two groundless lawsuits 
constituted improper means. The court also opined that although 
a deliberate breach of contract is not by itself an "improper 
means" that where a deliberate breach of contract is coupled with 
an immediate purpose to inflict injury, even though that purpose 
does not predominate over a legitimate economic end, the 
combination is sufficient to constitute an improper means. As 
demonstrated above, in the case at bar, the evidence persuasively 
demonstrated that the threats of groundless litigation were 
intended to and did destroy the proposed sublease with The Boyer 
Company. 
Anthony Middleton does not seriously argue that the threats 
were not made, but instead urges this court to adopt a rule that 
threats of litigation, regardless of how groundless and malicious, 
and despite the fact that they are issued with predominant purpose 
to injure and/or cause immediate harm, can never be sufficient for 
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an interference with prospective business relationship claim. The 
Middletons contend that only actual litigation which is terminated 
favorably and is determined to have been malicious should be a 
sufficient basis for such a claim. In this regard, Anthony 
Middleton urges the Court that it would be "repugnant to public 
policy to discourage potential litigants from stating their 
positions and alleged rights before resorting to the courts." 
[Williams & Hunt Brief, p. 46]. 
The argument that no limitation should be placed upon 
malicious threats of groundless litigation that can be thrown 
around in order to gain advantage in negotiations is fatuous. 
There is just no reasoned basis for arguing that it is against 
public policy to discourage people from destroying the business 
expectancies of others in order to obtain personal advantage by 
making malicious threats of litigation which are not only 
groundless, but known to be groundless. As was graphically 
demonstrated at trial, the issuance of a threat of litigation by 
a Landlord in the context of development and financing is an act 
that can itself destroy a business transaction. As Henry 
Schwendiman testified in the present case, the threat of litigation 
has an extremely chilling effect on real estate development and is 
one of the worst things with which a developer can be confronted. 
To allow individuals to maliciously threaten groundless litigation 
with impunity invites and encourages exactly the type of malicious 
"I have nothing to lose" attitude exhibited by Anthony Middleton 
in this case. 
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The damage inflicted by Anthony Middleton was complete when 
he made his threats. He did not have to follow through on those 
threats by actually filing suit. Thus, Medical Leasing had no 
opportunity to obtain a favorable ruling terminating the threatened 
litigation. That does not mean that Anthony Middleton1s right to 
resort to the courts was unprotected. The protection, of course, 
which Anthony Middleton was given in this case is that he was only 
held liable for intentional interference with prospective business 
relationships after it was first determined that he intentionally 
and maliciously made threats of groundless litigation which he knew 
were groundless for the purpose of sabotaging the transaction 
unless his demands were met. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 
587 (Cal. 1990), relied upon so heavily by the Middletons, is 
clearly distinguishable from the case at bar because in Pacific Gas 
the issue before the court was whether liability could be imposed 
for inducing "a potentially meritorious lawsuit." In the present 
case, the litigation threatened by Anthony Middleton was not 
"potentially meritorious"; it was known by him to be groundless. 
In addition, in Pacific Gas, the lawsuit which was induced by the 
defendant had actually been filed and was still pending. 
The other case cited by the Middletons, Blake v. Levy, 464 
A.2d 52 (Conn. 1983), is likewise distinguishable. In Blake, the 
prior litigation had been terminated in a good faith negotiated 
settlement. The court held that because it is the policy of the 
law to favor settlements, a party to a settlement ought not to be 
able to turn around and sue the other party either for malicious 
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prosecution or interference with prospective business relationships 
for bringing the lawsuit that was settled. 
Other courts have held that a party seeking recovery from 
interference with prospective business relationships on the basis 
of prior unfounded litigation is not required to allege favorable 
termination of that litigation. See, e.g., Erlandson v. Pullen, 
608 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Or. App. 1980); Herbert Products, Inc. v. Oxy-
Dry Sprayer Corp., 145 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. 1955). The view adopted 
by these cases is even more compelling when it is the wrongful 
threat of litigation which inflicted the damage and constitutes the 
gravaman of the claim. 
2• Privilege. 
Finally, Anthony Middleton insists that he was privileged 
to interfere with Medical Leasing's business relationship, relying 
upon Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962). This contention 
is frivolous. This court in Bunnell recognized that where a person 
has a legal right to perform an act he is not liable because that 
act induces a breach of contract and cited Prosser for the 
proposition that if a defendant has a present economic interest to 
protect, he is privileged to prevent performance which threatens 
that interest. It is pure fantasy to argue that Anthony Middleton 
had a legitimate economic interest to protect in the case at bar. 
If anything was made clear to the jury by the evidence, including 
Anthony Middleton's own testimony, it was that Medical Leasing had 
every right to do what it was doing and that the Middletons had no 
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right to interfere. In fact, Anthony Middleton had no economic 
interest in the development of the Property by The Boyer Company 
and the development of the Property by The Boyer Company did not 
threaten, in any respect, the only economic interest which he had -
- the right to be paid the rent specified in the Amended Ground 
Lease with Medical Leasing. See Bank of Utah v. Commercial 
Security Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 28-29 (10th Cir. 1966). 
Berqfeld v. Stork, 288 N.E.2d 15 (111. App. 1972), relied 
upon by the Middletons, is also not close to the point. In that 
case, the plaintiffs leased certain premises from the defendant 
upon which they operated a business. They agreed to sell that 
business to a Mr. Steik. At a time shortly before their lease term 
was expiring, Steik, seeking suitable quarters for the business, 
then entered into a new agreement to lease the premises from the 
defendant, but the defendant attempted to renege on the new lease 
agreement which was independent of plaintiff's and agreed to lease 
the same property to another company. Because of the attempted 
revocation by defendant, Steik cancelled his contract with 
plaintiffs and refused to complete it. The court simply found no 
allegations that defendant intentionally interfered with the 
contract between plaintiffs and Steik or that defendant acted 
maliciously against plaintiffs. The court noted that the 
defendant's interest in the new lease agreement with Steik was for 
his own benefit and his attempt to revoke it to enter into a more 
profitable lease at a higher rent was not inconsistent with a good 
faith purpose and that the attempted revocation did not cancel the 
lease between defendant and Steik nor did it cancel«the contract 
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between plaintiffs and Steik. The two elements found absent in 
Bergfeld, viz, intentional interference and malice, were 
specifically found present by the jury in this case. 
Finally, Anthony Middleton1s conduct could not have been 
privileged in any case because, as the jury found, that conduct the 
was willful and malicious. 
For all of the reasons stated above, there is no basis for 
overturning the jury's decision that Anthony Middleton interfered 
with Medical Leasing's prospective business relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Judgment should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this Q day of March, 1993. 
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